AI Supply Chain / AI BOM / Provenance Playbook
版本:v1.0
AI Supply Chain, AI BOM and Provenance Architecture Playbook
版本:v1.0 日期:2026-06-30 适用对象:AI PM、AI BA、Enterprise Architect、Solution Architect、Model Risk、Security、Vendor Risk、Data Governance、Procurement、Legal、Compliance、Internal Audit、金融零售业务负责人
定位:把 AI supply chain、AI Bill of Materials、component provenance、vulnerability/change response、license/data rights、concentration risk 和 exit readiness 统一成一套金融零售可执行架构手册。
核心结论:AI BOM 不是普通 SBOM 的改名版,也不是供应商清单。它是 AI workflow 的 component-level traceability layer,覆盖模型、供应商、数据集、RAG 语料、prompt、工具、MCP servers/connectors、eval datasets、人审供应商、telemetry stores、开源包、许可证、版本、签名、provenance、变更响应和退出路径。
重要说明:本文是学习、架构和作品集材料,不构成法律、监管、审计、采购或正式模型风险管理意见。真实项目必须由 business owner、model risk、security、privacy、legal、compliance、procurement、data governance、architecture 和 internal audit 共同确认。
1. Executive Framing
金融零售机构正在把 GenAI、RAG、Agent、MCP connector、AI workflow SaaS、评估工具和人工标注服务接入客户与运营流程。
AI supply chain 的真实边界比传统软件复杂:
- 模型可能来自多个 provider,并通过 gateway 动态路由。
- RAG 语料来自内部政策、客户记录、供应商文档、网页和第三方数据。
- Prompt pack 和 tool schema 能改变系统行为,却常常没有正式版本治理。
- MCP server 和 connector 把 Agent 能力扩展到 CRM、工单、支付、邮件和数据仓库。
- Eval dataset 和 human review rubric 会决定系统能否上线。
- Telemetry store 和 trace schema 决定审计和事故复盘是否可行。
- 开源模型、package、embedding model、reranker、tokenizer 和 license 会引入权利与漏洞风险。
核心问题:
Can we identify every component that can influence AI behavior, data exposure, evidence, cost, resilience or legal rights,
and can we trace that component to outputs, customers, workflows, owners, approvals and response actions?
AI BOM 提供四种能力:
| Capability | Meaning | Executive value |
|---|---|---|
| Component visibility | 看到模型、数据、prompt、tool、eval、人审和 telemetry 依赖 | 不再把 AI 系统当黑盒 |
| Provenance evidence | 证明组件来源、版本、签名、批准和使用记录 | 支持模型风险、审计和监管问询 |
| Response speed | 出现漏洞、投毒、许可证、模型更新或供应商变更时快速定位影响 | 降低事故范围和停机时间 |
| Exit readiness | 知道哪些组件可替换、可导出、可重建、可降级 | 降低集中度和锁定风险 |
AI BOM 不是:
| Misunderstanding | Correction |
|---|---|
| Only SBOM for Python packages | It includes software plus model, data, prompt, tool, eval and human-operational components. |
| Same as vendor inventory | Vendor inventory tracks suppliers; AI BOM tracks components and runtime use. |
| Same as model inventory | Model inventory tracks models; AI BOM tracks the full workflow component graph. |
| One-time spreadsheet | It must connect to release, runtime trace, eval, incident and exit workflows. |
SR 26-2 is a current model-risk anchor, but AI BOM must be broader than formal model inventory. Model inventory tells the institution what models it owns or uses; AI BOM tells the institution what exact component chain produced a behavior and what must be changed, tested, paused or exited when any component becomes risky.
2. Source Anchors
| Anchor | Official link | Playbook usage |
|---|---|---|
| CISA SBOM official page | https://www.cisa.gov/sbom | Establishes SBOM as a component transparency and vulnerability-response discipline. |
| NIST SSDF SP 800-218 | https://csrc.nist.gov/pubs/sp/800/218/final | Provides secure development practices: prepare, protect, produce, respond; extended here to AI component build and release. |
| OWASP Top 10 for LLM Applications | https://genai.owasp.org/llm-top-10/ | Supplies LLM application risks, including supply chain, prompt injection, sensitive disclosure, data/model poisoning, excessive agency and unbounded consumption. |
| NIST AI RMF | https://www.nist.gov/itl/ai-risk-management-framework | Organizes AI risk through Govern, Map, Measure and Manage; used for AI BOM governance operating model. |
| Federal Reserve SR 26-2 | https://www.federalreserve.gov/supervisionreg/srletters/SR2602.htm | Current model-risk anchor; used to position AI BOM as broader system-component evidence around formal model inventory. |
Anchor interpretation:
| Source | Strong use | Weak use |
|---|---|---|
| CISA SBOM | Use component transparency, supplier, version, dependency and response logic. | Claim SBOM alone covers AI systems. |
| NIST SSDF | Build secure release and response practices for AI artifacts. | Treat prompt, corpus and eval changes as outside lifecycle. |
| OWASP LLM Top 10 | Add AI-native supply-chain attack surfaces. | Only test direct jailbreak examples. |
| NIST AI RMF | Tie BOM to governance, mapping, measurement and management. | Treat BOM as purely technical inventory. |
| SR 26-2 | Link to model risk governance and inventory. | Collapse every AI component into a single model record. |
3. AI Supply Chain Scope
AI supply chain includes every external or internal component that can influence model behavior, retrieved context, prompt construction, tool/action execution, output safety, customer data exposure, audit replay, evaluation, incident response, operating cost, concentration or exit.
| Class | Examples | Why it matters |
|---|---|---|
| Model | hosted LLM, open-source model, reranker, embedding model, classifier | Direct behavior, cost, safety, model risk and provider dependency |
| Provider | model API, RAG SaaS, eval SaaS, cloud GPU, annotation vendor | Contract, subprocessor, support access, concentration |
| Dataset | training data, tuning data, third-party data, synthetic data | Rights, bias, privacy, provenance, deletion |
| RAG corpus | policy docs, procedures, product terms, call scripts, knowledge base | Grounding, permissions, source freshness |
| Prompt | system prompt, developer prompt, policy prompt, tool prompt | Instruction hierarchy, compliance language, behavior drift |
| Tool/API | customer summary, refund dry-run, case update, email send, fraud check | Agency, least privilege, approval and audit |
| MCP server/connector | CRM MCP, document search MCP, ticketing connector, payment connector | Tool discovery, manifest poisoning, token scope |
| Eval dataset | golden set, red-team set, regression set, fairness set | Release gate, safety evidence, model risk |
| Human review | QA vendor, labeling team, compliance reviewer, calibration panel | Operational quality, bias, confidentiality |
| Telemetry | trace store, SIEM, model observability, cost dashboard | Audit, monitoring, incident scoping |
| Open-source package | packages, container images, tokenizers, parsers, vector DB clients | Vulnerability, license, build integrity |
| License/rights | model license, data terms, generated-output rights, attribution | Legal use, commercial restriction, exit |
Relationship to existing inventories:
| Inventory | Scope | AI BOM relationship |
|---|---|---|
| Model inventory | Formal models, validation, tier, owner, monitoring | AI BOM references model inventory IDs and adds non-model components |
| Vendor inventory | Supplier entities, contracts, risk ratings, subprocessors | AI BOM maps components to vendors and subprocessors |
| Data catalog | Datasets, owners, classification, lineage | AI BOM references data assets used by AI workflows |
| Package SBOM | Software packages and dependencies | AI BOM includes SBOM artifacts as one component class |
| Prompt/eval registry | Templates, test sets, run records | AI BOM records prompt and eval versions in release manifests |
4. AI BOM Schema
Every component record should answer: what is it, where did it come from, who owns it, which version is approved, what rights apply, which workflows use it, how it is verified, and how it exits.
| Field | Example |
|---|---|
component_id | rag-corpus-card-fee-policy-2026q2 |
component_class | rag_corpus |
component_name | Credit Card Fee Policy Corpus |
version | 2026q2-v17 |
supplier_type | internal_policy_ops |
supplier_name | Card Servicing Policy Operations |
owner | Head of Card Servicing Knowledge |
business_capability | Customer servicing and dispute explanation |
approved_use | Ground employee Copilot answers for card fee and dispute policy |
prohibited_use | Autonomous fee waiver decision or direct customer legal disclosure |
risk_tier | High |
data_classification | Confidential internal policy; no customer PII |
license_or_rights | Internal policy use only; not redistributable outside institution |
source_uri | policy-repo://card/fees/2026Q2 |
checksum | sha256:4d8c91f0a72b6c20 |
signature_status | signed_by_policy_ops_release_key |
approval_record | AI-CHANGE-2026-0619-044 |
deployment_state | production |
replacement_option | rebuild from policy source registry into alternate vector index |
last_reviewed_at | 2026-06-30 |
Runtime usage record:
| Field | Example |
|---|---|
usage_event_id | aiuse-20260630-0001842 |
trace_id | trace-card-complaint-88172 |
workflow_id | card-dispute-copilot |
release_id | release-2026.06.30 |
component_id | prompt-card-dispute-sop |
component_version | v9 |
used_at | 2026-06-30T15:21:44Z |
use_context | prompt_assembly |
actor | service-principal-ai-gateway |
customer_case_reference | case-hash:8120b9 |
retention_class | high_risk_customer_service_trace |
Production release manifest should be signed:
{
"ai_bom_manifest_id": "aibom-card-dispute-copilot-2026.06.30",
"workflow_id": "card-dispute-copilot",
"risk_tier": "high",
"release_id": "release-2026.06.30",
"approved_by": ["card-servicing-owner", "model-risk-reviewer", "security-architect"],
"components": [
{"id": "model-route-primary", "class": "model_route", "version": "2026-06"},
{"id": "prompt-card-dispute-sop", "class": "prompt_pack", "version": "v9"},
{"id": "rag-corpus-card-fee-policy-2026q2", "class": "rag_corpus", "version": "2026q2-v17"},
{"id": "tool-transaction-summary", "class": "tool_api", "version": "v4"},
{"id": "mcp-crm-case-reader", "class": "mcp_server", "version": "v3.2.1"},
{"id": "eval-card-dispute-golden", "class": "eval_dataset", "version": "2026q2-v3"},
{"id": "trace-schema-ai-high-risk", "class": "telemetry_schema", "version": "v6"}
],
"release_gate": {"eval_result": "passed", "critical_failures": 0, "license_exceptions": 0}
}
Required relationships:
| Relationship | Meaning |
|---|---|
depends_on | Component cannot operate without another component |
derived_from | Component was created from another source or artifact |
provided_by | Component is supplied or operated by a vendor or internal group |
used_by | Component is used by a workflow, model, prompt, eval or output |
tested_by | Component is covered by a specific eval dataset or test |
controlled_by | Component is governed by a control, policy or contract term |
replaces | Component supersedes another version |
exit_to | Component has a replacement or degradation path |
5. Component-Level Design Notes
| Component | Metadata that matters most | Response question |
|---|---|---|
| Model | provider, deployment, version policy, data-use terms, model risk link, fallback route | Which outputs used this model version and can we pin or roll back? |
| Dataset | source, rights, sensitivity, provenance, approved use, deletion impact | Is this data allowed for eval, RAG, fine-tuning or vendor processing? |
| RAG corpus | source snapshot, chunk rule, embedding model, ACL, effective date, rebuild SLA | Which answers cited stale, unauthorized or withdrawn documents? |
| Prompt | owner, template version, policy linkage, signature, eval coverage | Did this prompt version change customer-facing behavior or tool access? |
| Tool/API | tool risk tier, permission, schema, approver, kill switch, idempotency | Can the model propose it and which system authorizes execution? |
| MCP server | manifest, methods, transport, token scope, sandbox, signature | Is the server allowlisted, scoped and safe from manifest/tool-output injection? |
| Eval set | source, synthetic/production flag, rubric, sensitivity, release gate | Does the release gate cover the component and risk being changed? |
| Human review | vendor, reviewer training, rubric, QA sampling, confidentiality | Did reviewer staffing or rubric drift change quality evidence? |
| Telemetry | trace schema, store, retention, masking, export, access | Can we replay the component chain for one high-risk output? |
| Package | package, version, license, maintainer, checksum, vulnerability state | Is the dependency exploitable or legally restricted? |
Design principle:
If changing a component can change an answer, permission, evidence record, customer impact, cost, legal right or exit path, it belongs in the AI BOM.
6. Provenance Graph
AI BOM gives the node list; provenance graph gives the edges and events. Without a provenance graph, the organization knows components exist but cannot prove how they produced a specific output.
PROV-style mapping:
| PROV concept | AI BOM example |
|---|---|
| Entity | model component, prompt pack, source document, chunk, eval item, output, trace |
| Activity | ingest, chunk, embed, sign, approve, retrieve, prompt assemble, invoke, review, retire |
| Agent | product owner, data owner, model provider, service principal, reviewer, vendor |
Graph example:
flowchart LR
A[Policy Source v12] --> B[Chunking Activity v5]
B --> C[RAG Corpus 2026Q2-v17]
C --> D[Retrieval Run trace-88172]
E[Prompt Pack v9] --> F[Prompt Assembly]
D --> F
G[Transaction Summary Tool v4] --> F
F --> H[Model Invocation enterprise-chat-2026-06]
H --> I[Employee Copilot Draft]
I --> J[Human Review QA Rubric v3]
J --> K[Customer Response Logged]
L[AI BOM Registry] -. component ids .-> C
L -. component ids .-> E
L -. component ids .-> G
L -. component ids .-> H
Minimum provenance events:
| Event | Required fields |
|---|---|
component_registered | ID, class, version, owner, supplier, source, risk tier |
component_verified | checksum, signature, license scan, rights review, security scan |
component_approved | approver, approved use, prohibited use, evidence, expiration |
component_deployed | environment, workflow, release, change ticket, effective time |
component_used | trace ID, workflow, component version, use context, actor |
component_evaluated | eval dataset, result, threshold, reviewer, release gate |
component_flagged | issue type, severity, detection source, response owner |
component_retired | replacement, migration evidence, deletion/export evidence |
Impact queries:
SELECT output_id, workflow_id, customer_case_hash, trace_id, generated_at
FROM ai_component_usage
WHERE component_id = 'rag-corpus-card-fee-policy-2026q2'
AND component_version = '2026q2-v17'
AND generated_at BETWEEN '2026-06-01' AND '2026-06-30';
SELECT DISTINCT workflow_id, business_owner, risk_tier, fallback_mode
FROM ai_bom_dependency_graph
WHERE dependency_component_id = 'mcp-crm-case-reader'
AND dependency_version = 'v3.2.1';
7. Change And Vulnerability Response
AI BOM response covers CVEs and AI-native component failures.
| Event type | Example |
|---|---|
| Software vulnerability | Vector DB client package has critical CVE |
| Model change | Provider announces material model update |
| Prompt issue | Prompt pack omits required complaint escalation language |
| Corpus issue | Stale fee policy remains retrievable |
| Dataset issue | Eval dataset contains unmasked customer field |
| Tool issue | MCP connector exposes broader method than approved |
| License issue | Open-source model license disallows commercial financial use |
| Human vendor issue | Review vendor changes offshore subprocessor |
| Telemetry issue | Trace store logs full account numbers |
| Concentration issue | Same model provider supports five critical workflows |
Response workflow:
Detect issue
-> classify component and severity
-> query impact graph
-> identify owners and affected workflows
-> choose containment: disable, rollback, pin, purge, reroute, human review
-> run targeted regression and safety eval
-> decide release, rollback or residual risk acceptance
-> update AI BOM status and evidence binder
Severity matrix:
| Severity | Criteria | Required action |
|---|---|---|
| Critical | Data leakage, unauthorized financial action, prohibited model/data use, active exploit, regulatory response likely | Immediate containment, executive notification, incident record, regression before restore |
| High | High-risk workflow impact, unsafe customer-facing output, serious license breach, material model drift | Owner task within 1 business day, impact query, release gate or rollback |
| Medium | Internal workflow degradation, non-critical component outdated, incomplete evidence | Fix in planned change window, monitor KRI |
| Low | Documentation mismatch or non-material metadata issue | Correct registry and evidence record |
Containment patterns:
| Component | Containment |
|---|---|
| Model | Pin prior version, route to fallback, disable high-risk workflow, force human review |
| RAG corpus | Mark source inactive, purge chunks, rebuild index, block citations |
| Prompt | Roll back prompt pack, disable tool access path, run regression |
| Tool/API | Disable method, revoke token, switch to read-only, require dual approval |
| MCP server | Remove from allowlist, rotate scoped token, sandbox, review manifest |
| Eval dataset | Quarantine dataset, remove sensitive cases, rerun benchmark |
| Human vendor | Pause queue, switch reviewer group, re-review sample, confirm confidentiality |
| Telemetry | Mask field, restrict access, rotate keys, preserve incident evidence |
| Open-source package | Patch, replace, rebuild image, verify signature |
Response evidence:
| Evidence | Purpose |
|---|---|
| Issue record | Detection source, component, severity, owner and timeline |
| Impact query result | Affected workflows, outputs, customers or releases |
| Containment action | Disable, rollback, route change, purge or review |
| Regression report | Issue no longer reproduces or residual risk is understood |
| Approval record | Business, risk and technical decision |
| AI BOM update | Component status, replacement and lessons learned |
8. License And Data Rights
Rights failures can block deployment, exit, audit or commercial use.
Examples:
- Open-source model license restricts commercial or financial-service use.
- Dataset terms allow evaluation but not fine-tuning.
- Vendor API terms allow prompt retention for abuse monitoring but not training.
- Generated output terms require attribution or restrict redistribution.
- Policy documents can be used internally but not shared with third-party annotation vendors.
Rights fields:
| Field | Example |
|---|---|
rights_owner | Card Servicing Legal |
permitted_use | internal employee Copilot grounding and QA evaluation |
prohibited_use | fine-tuning, external redistribution, public benchmark publication |
attribution_required | no external attribution; internal source ID required |
training_allowed | false |
eval_allowed | true with masked customer data |
redistribution_allowed | false |
expiry_or_review_date | 2026-12-31 |
evidence_uri | contract://AI-DPA-2026-044/section-data-use |
Review questions:
| Component | Rights question |
|---|---|
| Model | Does the license allow the intended commercial financial use and output handling? |
| Dataset | Does consent, contract or policy allow AI eval, RAG, training or vendor processing? |
| RAG corpus | Can source documents be embedded, chunked, sent to model provider or reviewed by vendor? |
| Eval set | Can production-derived examples be retained and shown to external validators? |
| Human review | Can reviewers see the data, where are they located, and what confidentiality terms apply? |
| Telemetry | Can logs be exported to SIEM, vendor support or audit workspace? |
9. Vendor, Subprocessor, Concentration And Exit
Component-to-vendor view:
| Component | Vendor / internal owner | Data exposed | Region | Subprocessor | Contract control |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Primary model route | Approved LLM Provider | Masked prompt and output | US approved region | Cloud infrastructure provider | No training, retention limit, change notice |
| Eval SaaS | EvalOps Vendor | Synthetic and masked eval cases | US | Annotation analytics provider | Confidentiality, deletion, export |
| Human QA review | Review Vendor A | Masked customer service transcripts | US operations only | Workforce platform | Location control, access log |
| CRM MCP server | Internal platform | Customer case metadata | Bank environment | None for runtime | Signed manifest, scoped token |
| Trace vault | Bank observability platform | Encrypted payload and manifest | Bank environment | Cloud KMS | Retention, audit access |
Concentration KRIs:
| Dimension | Example KRI |
|---|---|
| Model provider | Percent of high-risk AI workflows using same model provider |
| Cloud region | Percent of customer-facing AI calls in one region |
| RAG platform | Number of critical workflows on one vector/RAG SaaS |
| Eval vendor | Number of release gates dependent on one external evaluator |
| Human vendor | Percent of high-risk human review queue handled by one vendor |
| MCP connector | Number of workflows relying on one connector for case data |
| Telemetry store | Percent of audit replay dependent on one observability platform |
Exit mapping:
| Component | Exit question | Example answer |
|---|---|---|
| Model route | Can we reroute without rewriting applications? | Yes, via model gateway with provider-normalized schema |
| RAG corpus | Can we rebuild index outside vendor? | Yes, source registry plus chunk rule and embedding job are institution-owned |
| Prompt pack | Can prompts be exported and tested elsewhere? | Yes, prompt registry stores signed Markdown and JSON manifests |
| MCP connector | Can we disable or replace it without breaking all workflows? | Yes, tool gateway has per-workflow kill switch and alternate REST adapter |
| Eval set | Can we run release gate without vendor UI? | Yes, eval cases and expected behaviors are exported as JSONL |
| Telemetry | Can audit replay survive vendor termination? | Yes, evidence vault stores normalized trace records |
10. Dashboards And KRIs
Executive dashboard:
| KRI | Target posture |
|---|---|
| High-risk workflows with complete AI BOM | 100 percent before production |
| High-risk traces with component usage events | 100 percent |
| Components without owner | 0 in production |
| Components without rights review | 0 in high-risk workflows |
| Unsigned prompt/tool/corpus manifests | 0 in production |
| Critical components without exit path | 0 for customer-facing workflows |
| Model/provider concentration over threshold | Reviewed monthly with risk decision |
| Component vulnerabilities past SLA | 0 Critical; High tracked with owner |
Operational dashboard:
| Metric | Why it matters |
|---|---|
| Component change frequency by workflow | Detect unstable supply chain |
| Failed release gates by component class | Identify weak prompt, corpus, tool or eval areas |
| Runtime use of deprecated components | Detect stale deployments |
| Tool/MCP manifest drift | Detect connector changes outside approval |
| RAG source freshness | Prevent stale policy responses |
| License review aging | Prevent silent rights risk |
| Eval coverage by OWASP LLM risk | Prevent blind spots |
| Evidence trace completeness | Preserve audit replay |
Board / audit view:
| Question | Evidence |
|---|---|
| Which AI workflows are high-risk and customer-facing? | AI workflow inventory and risk tier map |
| Which providers and components are concentrated? | Component-to-provider concentration heatmap |
| Can we respond to a component issue quickly? | Last impact-query and containment exercise |
| Are model risk and AI BOM connected? | Model inventory records linked to AI BOM manifests |
| Are exits tested? | Annual exit rehearsal for critical components |
11. RACI
| Activity | Business | AI PM | BA | Architect | Security | Model Risk | Data Gov | Legal / Privacy | Procurement | Vendor Owner | Audit |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Define workflow scope | A | R | R | C | C | C | C | C | I | I | I |
| Identify AI BOM components | C | R | R | A | C | C | C | C | C | C | I |
| Classify risk tier | A | R | C | C | C | R | C | C | I | I | C |
| Review data rights | C | C | C | I | C | C | R | A | C | C | I |
| Review security and signatures | I | C | I | R | A | C | I | I | I | C | I |
| Approve model risk linkage | C | C | I | C | I | A | C | C | I | I | C |
| Manage vendor/subprocessor mapping | I | C | I | C | C | C | C | C | A | R | I |
| Approve production manifest | A | R | C | R | R | R | C | C | I | C | I |
| Monitor KRIs | A | R | C | R | R | R | C | C | C | R | C |
| Execute vulnerability response | A | R | C | R | A | R | C | C | C | R | I |
RACI key: R = responsible, A = accountable, C = consulted, I = informed.
12. Financial Retail Examples
12.1 Customer Service RAG
Use case: employee assistant drafts answers for credit card fees, disputes and refunds.
AI BOM focus:
- Model route, prompt pack, card policy corpus, transaction summary tool, CRM MCP server.
- Eval set for stale policy, complaint escalation, vulnerable customer language and fee-waiver edge cases.
- Trace store with prompt, model, corpus, tool and human review versions.
Failure scenario:
A retired annual-fee policy remains in the RAG index.
Impact graph identifies 184 outputs and 17 customer complaints.
Containment purges policy chunks, rebuilds index, requires human review for fee responses, and reruns regression set.
12.2 Credit Underwriting Copilot
Use case: analyst Copilot summarizes income, debt, documents and policy exceptions.
AI BOM focus:
- Document OCR package, income classification model, policy RAG corpus, prompt pack, exception scoring tool.
- Strict rights on borrower documents and production-derived eval cases.
- Model risk linkage because outputs may influence credit decision support.
Failure scenario:
OCR package update changes extraction of paystub year-to-date income.
AI BOM query identifies underwriting workflows using the package version.
Containment pins prior package, samples affected summaries, and adds regression cases.
12.3 AML Case Copilot
Use case: investigator assistant summarizes alerts, customer profile, transaction patterns and narrative draft.
AI BOM focus:
- High sensitivity data sources, typology corpus, narrative prompt, graph query tool, red-team eval.
- Telemetry evidence for audit and suspicious activity review.
- Vendor access must be tightly restricted because AML typologies and case data are sensitive.
Failure scenario:
MCP graph connector exposes a broader query scope than approved.
Tool gateway disables connector for AML workflows, rotates token, reviews trace usage and reruns excessive-agency tests.
12.4 Marketing Content Generator
Use case: marketing team drafts campaign copy with product constraints and brand tone.
AI BOM focus:
- Brand prompt pack, product disclosure corpus, approved claims dataset, image/font/license assets.
- Lower customer data exposure but higher output rights and disclosure accuracy risk.
Failure scenario:
Open-source image generation dependency changes license.
Rights review flags commercial use restriction, production release is blocked, and approved asset library replaces the component.
13. Templates With Concrete Examples
13.1 AI BOM Component Record
component_id: rag-corpus-card-fee-policy-2026q2
component_class: rag_corpus
component_name: Credit Card Fee Policy Corpus
version: 2026q2-v17
workflow_ids:
- card-dispute-copilot
- branch-card-servicing-assistant
owner: Head of Card Servicing Knowledge
supplier_type: internal
supplier_name: Card Policy Operations
risk_tier: high
approved_use: Ground employee Copilot answers about fees, disputes and provisional credits.
prohibited_use: Autonomous customer fee-waiver decisions and external redistribution.
data_classification: confidential_internal_policy
license_or_rights: internal_use_only
source_uri: policy-repo://card/fees/2026Q2
checksum: sha256:4d8c91f0a72b6c20
signature_status: signed_by_policy_ops_release_key
approval_record: AI-CHANGE-2026-0619-044
deployment_state: production
replacement_option: Rebuild corpus from approved policy source registry into alternate vector index.
exit_readiness: tested_2026_06_20
last_reviewed_at: 2026-06-30
13.2 Component Intake Checklist
| Question | Example answer |
|---|---|
| What business workflow uses this component? | card-dispute-copilot uses it for employee answer drafting. |
| Can it affect customer-facing output? | Yes, it grounds policy and disclosure language. |
| Does it process customer data? | No direct PII; runtime prompt may combine its chunks with masked customer summary. |
| Who owns it? | Card Servicing Knowledge Owner. |
| What version evidence exists? | Signed corpus snapshot with checksum and source document list. |
| What rights apply? | Internal policy, not redistributable to external reviewers. |
| What eval covers it? | Card dispute golden set and stale-policy regression set. |
| What is the exit path? | Rebuild index from policy source registry and reroute retrieval through alternate vector DB. |
13.3 Vulnerability Response Record
| Field | Example |
|---|---|
| Issue ID | AIBOM-INC-2026-0712-003 |
| Detection source | RAG source freshness monitor |
| Component | rag-corpus-card-fee-policy-2026q2 / 2026q2-v17 |
| Issue | Retired fee waiver paragraph remained in retrieval index. |
| Severity | High |
| Impact query | 184 outputs, 17 complaints, 2 fee-waiver escalation cases. |
| Containment | Marked source inactive, purged chunks, rebuilt index, forced human review on fee responses. |
| Regression | Stale-policy test pack passed on rebuilt index. |
| Business decision | Notify servicing managers; no customer notification after case review found no financial harm. |
| Evidence | Impact query export, purge certificate, eval report, decision memo. |
13.4 License Review Record
| Field | Example |
|---|---|
| Component | open-source-reranker-package / v2.4.0 |
| License | Apache-2.0 |
| Intended use | Internal RAG ranking for employee Copilot |
| Distribution | No external distribution; deployed as internal service |
| Training use | Not applicable; package does not receive training data |
| Attribution | License notice retained in internal third-party notice file |
| Risk decision | Approved for internal deployment |
| Reviewer | Legal Technology Counsel |
| Review date | 2026-06-18 |
13.5 Evidence Query
SELECT
t.trace_id,
t.workflow_id,
t.generated_at,
u.component_id,
u.component_version,
c.component_class,
c.owner,
c.risk_tier,
c.license_or_rights,
c.deployment_state
FROM ai_trace t
JOIN ai_component_usage u ON t.trace_id = u.trace_id
JOIN ai_bom_component c
ON u.component_id = c.component_id
AND u.component_version = c.version
WHERE t.trace_id = 'trace-card-complaint-88172'
ORDER BY c.component_class, c.component_id;
13.6 ADR Example
# ADR: AI BOM Registry For High-Risk GenAI Workflows
Decision date: 2026-06-30
Status: Accepted
Context: Card servicing, AML and credit Copilots depend on model, RAG, prompt, tool, MCP, eval and telemetry components. Existing model inventory and vendor inventory do not provide component-level runtime traceability.
Decision: Build an AI BOM registry connected to prompt registry, model gateway, RAG source registry, tool gateway, eval store and trace vault. Require signed release manifests for high-risk workflows.
Consequences: Release gates become stricter, but incident response can scope affected outputs and exit planning becomes evidence-based.
14. Operating Model
Lifecycle:
Plan component
-> intake and classify
-> verify source, license, signature and rights
-> approve for use
-> include in release manifest
-> capture runtime usage
-> monitor KRIs
-> respond to change/vulnerability
-> retire, replace or export
Governance forums:
| Forum | Decisions |
|---|---|
| AI Architecture Review | Component scope, integration, trace, gateway, exit and platform standards |
| Model Risk Review | Model linkage, validation, eval, monitoring and residual risk |
| Data Rights Review | License, consent, purpose, retention and deletion constraints |
| Security Review | Signatures, package vulnerabilities, MCP sandbox, tool permissions |
| Vendor Review | Provider/subprocessor, contract, SLA, support access, exit |
| Release Gate | Manifest completeness, eval result, vulnerabilities, rights and approvals |
| Quarterly Portfolio Review | Concentration, KRI trend, exit rehearsal and policy updates |
Evidence binder:
| Folder | Contents |
|---|---|
01-scope | Workflow scope, approved use, prohibited use, risk tier |
02-aibom | Component records, release manifest, dependency graph |
03-rights | License reviews, data-use decisions, vendor terms |
04-security | Signatures, scans, MCP reviews, tool permissions |
05-eval | Eval datasets, rubrics, results, reviewer calibration |
06-runtime | Trace completeness report, component usage samples |
07-response | Vulnerability records, impact queries, containment evidence |
08-exit | Export tests, fallback route, index rebuild, deletion certificates |
15. 30-Day Lab
Goal: Build an AI BOM and provenance response pack for one financial retail AI workflow.
| Day | Task | Output |
|---|---|---|
| 1 | Select workflow, business owner, customer impact and risk tier. | Workflow scope one-pager |
| 2 | Draw AI workflow from user input to model, RAG, tools, output and trace. | Data and component flow |
| 3 | Link formal model inventory records to the workflow. | Model linkage table |
| 4 | Identify non-model components: prompts, corpora, tools, MCP, eval, telemetry. | Draft AI BOM |
| 5 | Identify providers, subprocessors and human review vendors. | Component-to-vendor map |
| 6 | Classify data exposure by component. | Data exposure matrix |
| 7 | Record license and data-rights restrictions. | Rights review table |
| 8 | Define component IDs and version naming convention. | Naming standard |
| 9 | Create model and model-route records. | Model component records |
| 10 | Create RAG corpus and source-registry records. | RAG component records |
| 11 | Create prompt pack and policy pack records. | Prompt component records |
| 12 | Create tool API and MCP server records. | Tool and MCP records |
| 13 | Create eval dataset and rubric records. | Eval component records |
| 14 | Create telemetry and evidence-store records. | Telemetry component records |
| 15 | Build release manifest with signatures and approvals. | Signed manifest draft |
| 16 | Design provenance events and trace fields. | Provenance event schema |
| 17 | Write three impact queries for model, corpus and MCP issue. | Impact query pack |
| 18 | Define vulnerability severity matrix and SLA. | Response policy |
| 19 | Simulate stale RAG corpus issue. | Incident response record |
| 20 | Simulate MCP connector over-permission issue. | Tool containment record |
| 21 | Simulate license restriction issue. | Rights response record |
| 22 | Define dashboards and KRIs. | Dashboard spec |
| 23 | Map RACI across business, PM, BA, architect and risk. | RACI table |
| 24 | Create exit plan for one critical component. | Component exit runbook |
| 25 | Run mini exit rehearsal for RAG index rebuild or model reroute. | Exit evidence |
| 26 | Connect AI BOM to model inventory and vendor inventory. | Cross-inventory mapping |
| 27 | Build portfolio evidence binder. | Evidence pack |
| 28 | Write 30-second and 2-minute interview answer. | Interview script |
| 29 | Review against CISA, NIST SSDF, OWASP, NIST AI RMF and SR 26-2 anchors. | Source alignment memo |
| 30 | Present final architecture narrative. | 10-minute portfolio walkthrough |
16. Interview Answers
16.1 30-Second Version
AI BOM is the component-level traceability layer for GenAI systems. I would not stop at SBOM or model inventory. For a financial AI workflow, I would track models, providers, datasets, RAG corpora, prompt packs, tools, MCP servers, eval datasets, human review vendors, telemetry stores, open-source packages, licenses, versions, signatures and runtime usage. The goal is to answer: which exact components produced this output, what rights and risks attach to them, and how fast can we contain or replace them if something changes.
16.2 2-Minute Version
In financial retail, AI supply chain is broader than software supply chain. A customer service Copilot might depend on a hosted model, an internal policy corpus, an embedding model, prompt templates, transaction summary tools, an MCP CRM connector, eval datasets, human QA reviewers and a trace store. Any one of those can change behavior, expose data, break audit replay or create vendor lock-in.
I would build AI BOM as a registry plus provenance event log plus impact graph. The registry stores each component's owner, supplier, version, rights, approved use, risk tier, signature and exit option. The provenance event log records registration, verification, approval, deployment, runtime use, evaluation, vulnerability and retirement. The impact graph lets us answer response questions such as which outputs used a stale corpus, which workflows rely on one MCP server, or which eval sets contain production-derived data.
I would connect this to NIST AI RMF for governance, NIST SSDF for secure build and response discipline, OWASP LLM Top 10 for AI-native supply-chain risks, CISA SBOM for component transparency, and SR 26-2 for the model-risk anchor. The nuance is that SR 26-2 model inventory remains important, but AI BOM must include non-model components that materially affect outcomes.
16.3 Q: How is this different from vendor risk management?
Vendor risk management evaluates supplier lifecycle, contracts, financial condition, controls, subprocessors, SLA and exit. AI BOM operates one level deeper: it identifies component versions and runtime usage. A single vendor may supply many components, and a single workflow may depend on many vendors. AI BOM lets us scope exactly which component caused risk and which workflows, traces and outputs are affected.
16.4 Q: What components belong in an AI BOM?
Everything that can influence behavior, data exposure, evidence, rights, cost or exit belongs in scope: foundation model, embedding model, reranker, datasets, RAG corpus, prompt pack, policy pack, tool schema, MCP server, connector, eval dataset, human review vendor, telemetry schema, trace store, open-source packages, licenses and provider contracts.
16.5 Q: How would you respond to a poisoned RAG corpus?
First, flag the corpus component and query the impact graph to find affected workflows, outputs and cases. Second, contain by marking the source inactive, purging chunks, rebuilding the index, and forcing human review for affected answer categories. Third, run regression tests focused on the poisoned content and related policy scenarios. Fourth, update the AI BOM status, preserve evidence, notify owners and decide whether customer remediation or regulatory escalation is needed.
16.6 Q: Why are eval datasets part of supply chain?
Eval datasets determine what the system is allowed to ship. If an eval set is stale, biased, leaked, production-derived without rights, or missing adversarial cases, the release gate becomes false confidence. Eval sets need owners, versions, provenance, sensitivity classification, rights, retention, reviewer calibration and coverage mapping.
16.7 Q: How do MCP servers change AI supply-chain risk?
MCP servers expose tools and context to agents. Their manifests, descriptions, tokens and tool results can influence model behavior. A malicious or over-permissioned MCP server can cause data exfiltration, unauthorized tool calls or cross-agent propagation. AI BOM should track MCP server version, allowed methods, token scope, sandbox, signature, owner, runtime usage and kill switch.
16.8 Q: What would you show an executive?
I would show a simple heatmap: high-risk AI workflows, critical components, provider concentration, unsigned or unreviewed components, vulnerabilities past SLA, traces with complete component evidence, and exit readiness. The executive message is that the institution can identify dependencies, prove what produced customer-impacting outputs, respond quickly to component issues, and avoid uncontrolled lock-in.
17. Minimum Practice Checklist
| Area | Done standard |
|---|---|
| Scope | Workflow, owner, risk tier, approved and prohibited use are documented. |
| Component coverage | Model, data, RAG, prompt, tool, MCP, eval, human, telemetry and package components are assessed. |
| Metadata | Owner, supplier, version, rights, risk tier, signature, approval and exit fields are complete. |
| Provenance | Component lifecycle and runtime usage events are captured. |
| Release | Production manifests are signed and release-gated. |
| Response | Impact queries and containment actions are tested. |
| Rights | License and data-use restrictions are recorded. |
| Vendor | Component-to-vendor and subprocessor mapping is current. |
| KRI | Dashboards show completeness, vulnerabilities, concentration and exit readiness. |
| MRM | Formal model inventory is linked to AI BOM manifests. |