AI Incident / Postmortem / Reliability Playbook
当 AI 系统在生产中出现错误回答、错误检索、工具误用、PII 泄露、成本失控、延迟退化、模型漂移或 prompt injection 时,可靠性体系必须同时完成止血、影响界定、证据保全、复盘、纠正行动、防复发和治理升级。
AI Incident / Postmortem / Reliability Playbook
核心导读:当 AI 系统在生产中出现错误回答、错误检索、工具误用、PII 泄露、成本失控、延迟退化、模型漂移或 prompt injection 时,可靠性体系必须同时完成止血、影响界定、证据保全、复盘、纠正行动、防复发和治理升级。 学习主线:从 AI incident taxonomy、severity model 和 incident command 开始,逐步连接 containment / rollback、postmortem、corrective action register、reliability review board、game day、regulator / board communication 和 regression evidence。 系统边界:本文不讲基础业务分析方法,也不把复盘简化成事故报告模板;重点是 AI-native failure 的识别、响应、证据、架构决策和治理闭环。 证据输出:完成学习后,应能产出 incident taxonomy、severity matrix、war room runbook、rollback matrix、postmortem、corrective action register、game day decision log、board / regulator pack 和 reliability evidence binder。
重要说明:本文是学习与治理证据训练材料,不构成法律、监管、审计或正式安全意见。金融零售正式项目必须由 business owner、technology、security、privacy、legal、compliance、model risk、operational risk、internal audit 共同确认适用要求、通知义务、证据保留和客户补救。
1. 核心导读
传统事故管理问的是:
服务是否宕机,多久恢复,根因是什么,如何避免再发生。
AI 事故管理要多问五层:
AI 做错了什么
-> 哪个组件导致或放大了错误
-> 哪些客户、员工、案例、工具动作和监管义务受影响
-> 如何把系统恢复到受控状态
-> 如何把事故样本变成 eval、guardrail、架构门禁和治理证据
这份手册的核心观点:
AI reliability 不是模型准确率,不是 APM,也不是事后归档。它是一个从 detect、triage、command、contain、recover、postmortem、regression、governance 到 architecture decision 的运营闭环。
System Evidence Pack 的核心产出:
| Evidence artifact | 系统能力 |
|---|---|
| AI Incident Taxonomy | 能识别 AI-native failure,而不是只看 5xx 和 timeout。 |
| Risk-Tiered Severity Model | 能把客户伤害、监管风险、数据泄露、工具动作、成本和可用性合并分级。 |
| Incident Command Runbook | 能组织跨职能 war room,控制决策节奏和证据保全。 |
| Containment / Rollback Matrix | 能把模型、prompt、index、tool、policy、route、UI、vendor 变更恢复到受控状态。 |
| Postmortem Template | 能写出无责但有责任闭环的复盘。 |
| Corrective Action Register | 能把根因转成 owner、due date、control、regression evidence 和 residual risk。 |
| Reliability Review Board Charter | 能设计治理机制,而不是靠单个项目组临时判断。 |
| Game Day / Tabletop Pack | 能主动演练 bad retrieval、PII leak、tool misuse、policy bypass 和 cost spike。 |
2. Source Anchors
以下来源作为本文的外部锚点。正式项目应记录 access date、版本、内部 policy mapping 和 legal / risk sign-off。
| Source | Official / primary link | 本手册使用方式 |
|---|---|---|
| NIST AI RMF | https://www.nist.gov/itl/ai-risk-management-framework | 用 Govern / Map / Measure / Manage 组织 AI 风险识别、度量、处置和治理闭环;把 incident loop 接入 AI inventory、risk tier、monitoring 和 management reporting。 |
| NIST GenAI Profile | https://www.nist.gov/publications/artificial-intelligence-risk-management-framework-generative-artificial-intelligence | 用于识别 GenAI 独特风险:生成内容错误、数据泄露、滥用、供应商依赖、评测限制、lifecycle actor 和治理证据。 |
| NIST CSF 2.0 | https://www.nist.gov/cyberframework | 用 Govern、Identify、Protect、Detect、Respond、Recover 的网络安全运营语言组织 AI incident response、恢复、证据和改进。 |
| Google SRE Postmortem Culture | https://sre.google/sre-book/postmortem-culture/ | 用无责复盘、明确 postmortem 触发条件、根因与贡献因素、预防措施跟踪来设计 AI postmortem culture。 |
| MITRE ATLAS | https://atlas.mitre.org/ | 用 AI attack tactics / techniques 组织 prompt injection、data poisoning、model evasion、exfiltration、tool misuse 等攻击路径和事件分析。 |
| OECD AI Incidents Monitor | https://oecd.ai/en/incidents | 用 AI incident / hazard、harm type、affected stakeholder、autonomy level、business function 等字段训练外部事件雷达和分类语言。 |
| AI Observability / Cost / SLO Playbook | docs/AI_OBSERVABILITY_COST_SLO_PLAYBOOK.md | 把 trace、span、quality dashboard、SLO、cost ledger 和 incident timeline 接入本文的响应流程。 |
| AI Threat Modeling / Red Team / Agent Security Playbook | docs/AI_THREAT_MODELING_RED_TEAM_PLAYBOOK.md | 把 threat model、red-team scenario、tool gateway、DLP、kill switch 和 tabletop 接入事故防复发。 |
| AI Model Risk Management Playbook | docs/AI_MODEL_RISK_MANAGEMENT_PLAYBOOK.md | 把 incident、model drift、eval regression、model change 和 validation issue 转成 MRM 证据。 |
| AI Audit Evidence Binder Playbook | docs/AI_AUDIT_EVIDENCE_BINDER_PLAYBOOK.md | 把事故日志、RCA、corrective action、approval、customer remediation 和 regression result 纳入审计证据包。 |
3. 高级框架:AI Reliability Operating Loop
AI 可靠性不是单点能力,而是一个运营循环。
1. Detect
-> telemetry, eval regression, customer complaint, analyst override, cost alert, security alert
2. Triage
-> classify failure type, severity, affected population, customer/regulatory impact, active blast radius
3. Command
-> assign incident commander, scribe, domain owners, decision cadence, evidence preservation
4. Contain
-> disable risky path, rollback prompt/model/index/tool/policy, route to safe fallback, pause automation
5. Recover
-> validated fix, regression tests, staged restart, enhanced monitoring, customer remediation
6. Postmortem
-> timeline, impact, root cause, contributing factors, detection gaps, response gaps, decision quality
7. Prevent recurrence
-> eval cases, guardrails, architecture decision, release gate, SLO changes, ownership changes
8. Govern
-> reliability review board, risk acceptance, audit evidence, board/regulator/customer communication
3.1 AI Incident 和普通 Incident 的差异
| 维度 | 普通生产事故 | AI 生产事故 |
|---|---|---|
| 成功假象 | HTTP 200 通常代表技术成功 | HTTP 200 可能返回错误、幻觉、过期政策、越权工具建议或泄露内容 |
| 根因对象 | code、infra、dependency、capacity | model、prompt、RAG、index、policy、tool、judge、human handoff、vendor route、feedback loop |
| 影响范围 | 请求失败、服务不可用、数据丢失 | 客户误导、错误业务动作、监管陈述错误、PII 泄露、偏见、成本爆炸、模型风险 |
| 证据要求 | logs、metrics、deployment history | trace、prompt version、model version、retrieved docs、tool calls、policy decisions、human review、eval result |
| 恢复策略 | rollback、reroute、scale、fix code | pin model、freeze prompt、rollback index、disable tool、force template、switch to human queue、re-run eval |
| 防复发 | tests、alerts、runbook | regression eval、golden set、adversarial cases、control mapping、architecture gate、review board |
3.2 AI Reliability 的四个控制面
| 控制面 | 关注问题 | 关键 owner | 典型证据 |
|---|---|---|---|
| Product control plane | AI 被允许回答什么、建议什么、执行什么、何时升级人工 | Product governance / Business Owner | use case boundary、risk tier、customer impact map、fallback policy |
| Architecture control plane | 模型、RAG、工具、策略、日志、回滚、供应商如何被隔离和控制 | AI Architect / Platform Owner | C4 diagram、component version map、kill switch design、route policy |
| Risk control plane | 风险等级、验证、持续监控、残余风险、审计证据是否成立 | Model Risk / Compliance / Audit | validation issue log、control evidence、risk acceptance、management attestation |
| Operations control plane | 谁值班、谁指挥、如何止血、如何沟通、如何复盘 | SRE / Incident Commander | incident state doc、timeline、postmortem、corrective action register |
4. AI Incident Taxonomy
事故分类的目的不是贴标签,而是决定谁进 war room、先切断哪个路径、保留哪些证据、启动哪些通知和回归测试。
| Category | 典型症状 | 关键证据 | 立即 containment | 防复发方向 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Bad retrieval | RAG 找到过期、错误、低权限、跨租户或不相关文档 | query、index version、retrieved doc IDs、ACL filter、citation IDs、freshness | 回滚 index;禁用问题文档;切换权威搜索;强制引用校验;高风险问题转人工 | source trust、ACL test、freshness SLO、retrieval eval、index release gate |
| Hallucination | 模型生成未被证据支持的事实、政策、金额、日期、原因 | prompt、model output、citation support score、judge result、human edits | 限制答案类型;启用 answerability gate;高风险回复改模板;增加拒答 | groundedness eval、citation checker、template locking、risk-tiered response policy |
| Policy bypass | 模型绕过业务、合规、安全、销售、投资建议或投诉规则 | policy decision log、guardrail result、prompt version、conversation | 启用 blocklist / classifier;关闭自由生成路径;高风险 intent 强制升级 | policy engine externalization、rule test suite、prompt conflict review |
| Tool misuse | Agent 调错工具、越权查询、重复执行、错误提交、错误更新 case | tool span、tool args hash、approval ID、side effect、idempotency key | 关闭写工具;改 dry-run;冻结高风险 action;撤销错误动作;人工复核队列 | tool permission matrix、step budget、dual control、idempotency、approval UX |
| PII / PCI / secrets leak | 输出、日志、外发工具或供应商调用泄露敏感数据 | output sample、DLP result、egress log、trace redaction、affected records | 停止外发;启用 redaction;关闭日志明文;通知 privacy/legal;隔离供应商 route | data minimization、DLP regression、log masking、field-level policy、tenant isolation |
| Cost spike | token、retrieval、rerank、judge、tool 或 loop 导致成本异常 | cost ledger、route policy、token counts、cache status、loop trace | 启用 budget cap;降级模型;限制上下文;关闭 retry loop;rate limit | unit economics SLO、loop detector、quota、prompt size budget、cache policy |
| Latency degradation | TTFT、total latency、tool latency、queue wait、judge latency 超阈值 | latency spans、queue metrics、vendor status、retrieval timing | 降级模型;绕过非必要 judge;减少 top_k;启用 cached answer;切换 fallback | latency SLO、capacity test、route policy、timeout budget、dependency isolation |
| Model drift / eval regression | 离线或线上质量分数下降,升级后行为改变 | eval run ID、model alias、prompt/index version、golden set delta | pin 旧模型;停止 rollout;扩大 human review;回滚 route | canary eval、shadow test、model pinning、approval workflow、drift dashboard |
| Prompt injection | 用户、文档、网页、邮件、tool output 诱导模型忽略规则或泄露 | malicious payload、context labels、tool proposal、blocked/allowed decision | 禁用受影响入口;强制 untrusted-context labeling;关闭外发和写工具 | adversarial eval、instruction hierarchy、tool gateway、content isolation |
| Data / index poisoning | 知识库、记忆、feedback、fine-tuning data 被恶意或错误内容污染 | source change log、document owner、index manifest、memory write log | 暂停 ingest;回滚 index;清理 memory;冻结 feedback training | source approval、data lineage、memory governance、poisoning red-team |
| Judge failure | LLM judge 或规则评测误判,使坏输出通过或好输出被误挡 | judge prompt、rubric version、expert disagreement、score drift | 暂停自动通过;改人工抽样;回滚 judge prompt;提高阈值 | judge calibration、expert benchmark、rubric versioning、meta-eval |
| Human handoff failure | 本应升级人工但未升级,或人工无法理解 AI 上下文 | escalation log、queue SLA、handoff payload、review notes | 强制人工队列;停止自动完成;补发 case context | warm handoff spec、queue SLO、review training、override analytics |
| Vendor / dependency incident | LLM、embedding、vector DB、tool API、MCP server、cloud 出现异常或变更 | vendor status、model version、contract notice、route log | 切换 vendor;降级本地模型;禁用第三方 connector;冻结新请求 | vendor exit plan、multi-provider route、contract controls、dependency game day |
4.1 事件不是事故的边界
| Signal | 何时只是 event | 何时升级为 incident |
|---|---|---|
| 单个差评 | 用户主观不满意,未违反政策或证据 | 命中高风险 intent、客户受损、同类模式重复、人工判定错误严重 |
| Eval 下降 | 低风险指标轻微波动,未进生产 | 高风险 golden set fail、已上线版本退化、release gate 被绕过 |
| 成本升高 | 预算内季节性流量 | 单 use case 超预算、loop / abuse、单位经济性失效、影响服务能力 |
| Prompt injection 被拦截 | 控制按预期工作 | 拦截率异常升高、出现未拦截样本、攻击者触发工具提议或数据外泄 |
| 客户投诉 | 普通服务投诉 | 投诉指向 AI 误导、拒绝人工、错误承诺、错误费用、歧视或隐私问题 |
5. Severity Model:AI 事故分级
Severity 必须按影响和控制失效,而不是按团队紧张程度。建议将金融零售 AI 事故分为 SEV0 到 SEV4。
| Severity | 定义 | 触发条件 | 决策权限 | 默认动作 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| SEV0 - Critical AI Harm | 已造成或极可能造成重大客户伤害、监管违规、重大数据泄露、资金损失、系统性错误业务动作或董事会级声誉风险 | PII / PCI 大规模泄露;客户资金或账户状态被错误改变;监管报告/AML/SAR 重大错误;高风险 agent 自动执行失控;跨租户数据暴露 | Executive incident lead + Legal / Risk / CISO / Business head | 立即停用相关 AI path;保全证据;启动客户补救、法律评估、监管沟通准备和董事会通知 |
| SEV1 - High Impact | 影响受监管流程、客户可见输出或高风险员工决策,但可通过快速 containment 限制范围 | 错误 KYC / AML 建议批量出现;客服 AI 给出错误费用/权利说明;高风险工具绕过审批但未大规模执行 | Incident Commander + Business Owner + Model Risk / Compliance | 冻结变更;回滚组件;扩大人工复核;24-48 小时内完成初版 postmortem |
| SEV2 - Material Degradation | 质量、安全、延迟、成本或可用性显著退化,影响业务效率或中风险流程 | groundedness 低于阈值;retrieval freshness failure;p95 延迟超 SLO;单位成本超预算;人工拒绝率异常 | IC + Product / Platform Owner | 降级或分流;开 corrective action;一周内完成复盘和回归证据 |
| SEV3 - Controlled Issue | 局部问题,已被 guardrail、人审或监控捕获,没有客户实质影响 | bad retrieval 被 answerability gate 拦截;prompt injection 被阻断;低风险 internal copilot 错误 | Product / Ops Owner | 记录 issue;转 regression case;下次 review board 汇总 |
| SEV4 - Learning Signal | 早期 hazard、近失误、桌面演练发现、离线 eval 失败 | tabletop 发现 runbook 缺口;red-team 样本失败;外部 incident radar 触发内部 review | Reliability owner | 更新测试、runbook、training 和 backlog |
5.1 Severity 判定维度
| Dimension | Low | Medium | High | Critical |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Customer harm | 无客户影响 | 客户困惑或轻微不便 | 客户权益、费用、投诉、账户操作受影响 | 大规模客户损害、资金或法律权利受影响 |
| Regulatory exposure | 无监管流程 | 间接流程 | AML/KYC/credit/complaints/adverse action 受影响 | 监管报告、法定义务、消费者保护严重风险 |
| Data sensitivity | 无敏感数据 | 内部数据 | PII、交易、身份、信用、AML 数据 | 大规模 PII/PCI、跨租户、外部泄露 |
| Automation level | read / summarize | recommend / draft | act with approval | act without effective approval 或不可逆动作 |
| Blast radius | 单请求 | 单团队或小样本 | 多业务线、客户群或高价值客户 | 系统性、跨租户、跨区域 |
| Detectability | 自动拦截 | 监控发现 | 客户/员工发现 | 外部媒体、监管、审计或重大投诉发现 |
| Reversibility | 可立即修正 | 可补救 | 补救成本高 | 难以逆转或需客户/监管通知 |
5.2 AI-Specific SEV Escalation Rules
| Trigger | 最低 SEV |
|---|---|
| 客户可见 AI 输出虚构费用、资格、拒绝原因、投诉权利、投资/信贷建议 | SEV1 |
| AI 工具调用改变客户账户、交易、退款、case 状态,且审批或幂等失效 | SEV1;若不可逆或批量执行则 SEV0 |
| PII / PCI / secrets 出现在客户可见输出、外部工具、供应商 ticket、日志导出 | SEV1;大规模或跨租户则 SEV0 |
| AML / KYC / fraud / credit 高风险流程中的 AI 建议系统性错误 | SEV1;若影响监管提交或客户权益则 SEV0 |
| Prompt injection 导致工具提议、数据外泄、policy bypass 或持久化污染 | SEV1 |
| Eval regression 已进入生产且影响高风险 use case | SEV1 |
| 成本异常导致预算熔断、服务降级或其他客户流程受影响 | SEV2;若影响关键服务可升 SEV1 |
6. Incident Command:AI War Room 设计
AI 事故不能只由工程值班处理,因为根因可能是业务政策、模型版本、知识库、工具权限、人工流程或供应商变更。War room 需要明确角色,而不是所有人同时发言。
6.1 角色与职责
| Role | 主要职责 | 关键决策 |
|---|---|---|
| Incident Commander | 控制节奏、分配任务、设定更新频率、做最终 operational decision | 是否升级 SEV;是否停用 AI path;是否宣布 containment 完成 |
| Scribe / Evidence Lead | 记录 timeline、decision log、证据链接、版本和行动项 | 哪些证据进入 postmortem 和 audit binder |
| AI Product Lead | 定义客户/业务影响、fallback experience、补救路径和用户沟通 | 是否关闭某类 intent;是否切人工;如何处理受影响用户 |
| AI Architect / Platform Lead | 判断组件边界、回滚路径、route policy、日志保全和技术恢复 | rollback model / prompt / index / tool / policy / vendor 的顺序 |
| Model Risk / Validation | 判断模型风险、eval regression、验证缺口和风险接受 | 是否需要 re-validation;是否阻止 restart |
| Security Lead | 判断 prompt injection、exfiltration、tool abuse、credential / connector 风险 | 是否启动 security incident;是否隔离 connector / secrets / MCP server |
| Privacy / Data Protection | 判断 PII / PCI / sensitive data 暴露、通知义务和数据最小化缺口 | 是否需要 privacy incident workflow |
| Legal / Compliance | 判断监管、合同、客户通知、投诉和保存义务 | 是否准备 regulator response、legal hold 或 board escalation |
| Business Owner | 判断业务影响、客户补救、人工产能和 residual risk | 是否接受降级服务;是否暂停流程 |
| Customer / Operations Lead | 执行客户支持、人工队列、分行/坐席指引、话术 | 如何识别和联系受影响客户 |
| Vendor Owner | 协调模型/云/工具供应商、SLA、变更说明和证据 | 是否切换 vendor;是否触发合同 incident notice |
6.2 War Room 节奏
| 阶段 | 时间目标 | 产出 |
|---|---|---|
| First 15 minutes | 确认 SEV、IC、scribe、受影响系统、初始 containment owner | Incident state doc、bridge channel、decision cadence |
| First 30 minutes | 锁定 blast radius、证据保全、是否关闭高风险路径 | Impact hypothesis、freeze decision、initial customer / regulatory exposure |
| First 60 minutes | 执行 containment、确认 fallback、开始受影响对象识别 | Containment decision、rollback record、affected population query |
| First 4 hours | 验证 containment 有效、准备内部更新、定义补救策略 | Stable state declaration、executive update、remediation backlog |
| First 24 hours | 初版 postmortem、customer/regulator/board communication draft、regression plan | Draft RCA、corrective action register、communication pack |
| First 5 business days | 完整复盘、review board、risk acceptance 或 restart approval | Final postmortem、evidence pack、board / regulator-ready summary |
6.3 Decision Log 最小字段
| Field | 示例 |
|---|---|
| Decision ID | DEC-2026-AML-001 |
| Time | 2026-06-29 14:35 America/Chicago |
| Decision | 禁用 AML copilot 的 free-form SAR narrative 生成,仅保留 evidence summary |
| Decision owner | Incident Commander + AML Business Owner |
| Rationale | 发现 4 个高风险 case 的 narrative 引用了过期 typology;RAG index rollback 尚未完成 |
| Alternatives considered | 仅提高 judge 阈值;全量停用 copilot;切换旧 index |
| Risk accepted | 分析员效率下降,但避免错误 narrative 进入提交流程 |
| Evidence link | trace IDs、index manifest、affected case query、approval record |
| Revisit condition | 新 index 通过 50 个 regression cases 且 Model Risk 批准 restart |
7. Containment / Rollback 决策矩阵
AI containment 的原则:
先停止伤害,再恢复能力;
先切断高风险动作,再修复回答质量;
先保全证据,再清理状态;
先验证 rollback,再重新放量。
7.1 组件级 Rollback Matrix
| Suspected component | 典型信号 | 最快 containment | 可靠恢复条件 |
|---|---|---|---|
| Model | 同一 prompt / index 下输出风格、拒答、准确性突然变化 | pin previous model;切备用 provider;提高 human review | Canary eval 通过;供应商变更说明复核;高风险 sample 专家复核 |
| Prompt | 新版本后 policy bypass、格式错误、拒答下降 | rollback prompt template;锁定 approved response templates | Prompt diff review;regression eval;policy owner sign-off |
| RAG index | 错误引用、过期政策、权限错配、freshness failure | rollback index;禁用受污染 source;改权威门户 fallback | Index manifest 校验;ACL test;source owner approval;retrieval eval |
| Retriever / reranker | 召回相关性下降、低信任文档上位 | 降级到 hybrid search;调整 top_k / filters;禁用 reranker | Retrieval benchmark 回归;low-trust source penalty 验证 |
| Tool gateway | 越权 tool proposal、approval bypass、重复执行 | 关闭写工具;只读模式;强制 manual approval | Permission matrix review;idempotency test;approval trace sample |
| Policy engine / guardrail | 拦截突然下降或误拦截上升 | 回滚 rule set;启用 conservative mode;强制 escalation | Policy test suite;false positive / false negative review |
| Memory / feedback loop | 污染记忆、错误偏好、重复错误学习 | 暂停 memory read/write;清理污染记录;禁用 online learning | Memory lineage review;write policy test;sampling approval |
| Judge / eval | 坏输出通过、好输出被拒、分数漂移 | 暂停自动通过;转人工抽样;回滚 judge prompt | Expert calibration;judge benchmark;threshold review |
| UI / disclosure | 客户误解 AI 能力、无法转人工、错误提示 | 改静态文案;强制人工入口;关闭高风险 flow | UX content approval;complaint trigger test;accessibility check |
| Vendor dependency | 延迟、输出异常、版本漂移、SLA 告警 | Route away;降级本地或备用模型;暂停 connector | Vendor RCA;contract notice;internal canary;exit plan review |
7.2 Failure Type 到 Containment
| Failure | First containment | Second containment | Recovery gate |
|---|---|---|---|
| Bad retrieval | 回滚 index 或禁用 source | 高风险问题强制人工 | 通过 retrieval golden set、ACL test、freshness check |
| Hallucination | 限制自由生成;启用模板 | 降级为引用摘要或拒答 | groundedness >= threshold;expert sample pass |
| Policy bypass | 启用 conservative policy | 暂停相关 intent | policy regression suite pass;compliance sign-off |
| Tool misuse | 禁用写工具 | 撤销 / 补偿 side effect;重放 idempotency check | tool permission test;approval audit sample |
| PII leak | 停止外发和明文日志 | 识别 affected records;privacy workflow | DLP regression pass;redaction evidence;legal decision |
| Cost spike | 预算熔断和 rate limit | 降级模型、缩短上下文、停 retry loop | unit cost 回到 SLO;loop detector verified |
| Latency degradation | route to fast path | 关闭非必要 judge / rerank / long context | p95 latency stable;capacity margin confirmed |
| Model drift | pin previous model | 增加人工复核 | canary eval + shadow traffic pass |
| Prompt injection | 隔离入口和不可信内容 | 关闭工具 / 外发 / memory write | adversarial regression pass;security approval |
7.3 Kill Switch 分层
| Switch level | 作用范围 | 适用场景 | 风险 |
|---|---|---|---|
| L1 Response mode switch | 从生成回答切到模板、拒答或引用摘要 | hallucination、policy bypass、customer-facing risk | 用户体验下降,但业务不中断 |
| L2 Intent switch | 关闭某类 intent,例如投诉、退款、KYC exception | 单个业务 flow 失控 | 人工队列压力上升 |
| L3 Tool switch | 禁用写工具、外发工具、高风险查询工具 | tool misuse、prompt injection、PII leak | 自动化收益下降 |
| L4 Component switch | 回滚 model、prompt、index、policy、judge | 组件变更引发回归 | 可能回到旧缺陷,需要回归验证 |
| L5 System switch | 停用整个 AI capability | SEV0 或无法确认 blast radius | 业务影响最大,但止血最确定 |
8. Detection and Evidence:没有证据就没有复盘
AI incident 的证据必须能回答:
谁问了什么
系统看到了什么
模型/检索/工具/策略如何决策
输出影响了谁
我们何时知道、何时止血、何时确认恢复
8.1 Detection Signals
| Signal | 检测来源 | 可触发的 incident 类型 |
|---|---|---|
| Human reject spike | QA / reviewer decision | hallucination、bad retrieval、policy bypass、model drift |
| Citation support failure | groundedness judge、citation checker | hallucination、bad retrieval、index poisoning |
| Tool policy denied spike | tool gateway | prompt injection、excessive agency、permission issue |
| DLP hit | output filter、egress gateway、log scanner | PII leak、secrets leak、cross-tenant data issue |
| Cost per case spike | cost ledger | loop、long-context expansion、abuse、vendor price/route change |
| p95 / p99 latency breach | tracing / APM | vendor degradation、retrieval slowdown、judge bottleneck |
| Eval regression | CI / release gate / scheduled eval | model drift、prompt regression、index regression |
| Customer complaint | contact center、complaints system、social channel | customer-facing hallucination、handoff failure、wrong advice |
| Security alert | SIEM、WAF、MCP gateway、red-team monitor | prompt injection、tool abuse、exfiltration |
| External incident radar | OECD monitor、industry reports、vendor notices | hazard review、third-party dependency risk |
8.2 Evidence Pack 最小内容
| Evidence | 字段 |
|---|---|
| Incident state doc | SEV、status、IC、scribe、systems、affected use cases、current containment |
| Timeline | detection、triage、decision、rollback、recovery、communication、restart |
| Trace sample | trace IDs、request IDs、user role、workflow step、risk tier |
| Version map | model、prompt、index、retriever、reranker、judge、policy、tool schema、UI copy |
| Impact query | affected customers / cases / employees / transactions / outputs |
| Tool side effect log | tool name、arguments hash、approval ID、result、reversal / compensation |
| Data exposure assessment | fields exposed、records count、destination、retention、redaction status |
| Eval / regression result | failed cases、baseline, current score, rerun after fix |
| Communication record | internal update、customer script、regulator memo、board brief |
| Corrective action register | owner、due date、control, verification evidence, closure decision |
8.3 Trace Fields for Incident Readiness
| Field group | Required fields |
|---|---|
| Business context | use_case_id、risk_tier、workflow_step、customer_segment、employee_role、case_id |
| AI component versions | model_alias、model_version、prompt_id、prompt_version、index_version、policy_version、judge_version |
| Retrieval | query、filters、retrieved_doc_ids、citation_doc_ids、source_trust、freshness_days、ACL decision |
| Tool | tool_name、risk_level、input_hash、policy_decision、approval_id、side_effect、idempotency_key |
| Safety | guardrail_decision、DLP_decision、prompt_injection_score、escalation_reason |
| Quality | groundedness_score、citation_correctness、answerability、human_review_decision、edit_reason |
| Performance | ttft_ms、total_latency_ms、retrieval_latency_ms、tool_latency_ms、judge_latency_ms |
| Cost | input_tokens、output_tokens、reasoning_tokens、retrieval_cost、judge_cost、tool_cost、total_cost |
| Audit | trace_id、request_id、retention_class、redaction_status、access_control_group |
9. Postmortem:无责,但不能无行动
AI postmortem 的质量标准:
| Bad postmortem | Good postmortem |
|---|---|
| “模型幻觉了,已优化 prompt” | 明确哪个模型 / prompt / index / policy / tool / workflow 组合失效,为什么控制没有拦住,如何验证不会复发 |
| “用户问法太刁钻” | 识别产品边界、answerability gate、fallback 和 user education 是否不足 |
| “坐席没有认真审核” | 分析人审界面是否提供证据、风险提示、差异高亮和足够时间 |
| “供应商模型变了” | 检查 vendor change notice、model pinning、canary eval、route policy 和 exit plan |
| “已加强监控” | 说明新增指标、阈值、owner、alert route、演练和验证样本 |
9.1 Postmortem Template
# AI Incident Postmortem: AML Copilot Bad Retrieval, 2026-06-29
## 1. Executive Summary
- Incident ID: AI-INC-AML-2026-001
- Severity: SEV1
- Status: Contained, restart pending Reliability Review Board approval
- Use case: AML Copilot evidence summary and SAR narrative draft
- Business owner: Head of AML Operations
- Incident commander: AI Platform SRE Lead
- Detection time: 2026-06-29 09:42 America/Chicago
- Containment time: 2026-06-29 10:18 America/Chicago
- Recovery time: 2026-06-30 16:00 America/Chicago after regression approval
- Customer / business impact: 23 AML cases required analyst re-review; no customer-facing message sent
- Regulatory / privacy / security exposure: Potential regulatory narrative quality risk; no PII leakage and no SAR submission confirmed
- Current residual risk: Low after index rollback, narrative freeze and freshness regression
## 2. What Happened
- Observable symptom: Senior analyst found SAR draft citing a typology retired in 2026-Q1
- AI failure category: Bad retrieval and hallucinated regulated narrative
- Affected users / cases / customers / transactions: 9 analysts, 23 AML cases, 0 customer contacts, 0 submitted SARs
- Affected AI components: AML policy index v2026.06.28, retrieval filter v1.7, narrative prompt v3.2
- First known bad version: index-aml-policy-2026.06.28
- Last known good version: index-aml-policy-2026.06.21
## 3. Impact
| Impact area | Assessment | Evidence |
|---|---|---|
| Customer harm | No direct customer impact; cases stayed in analyst workflow | case_state_query_2026_06_29.csv |
| Operational impact | 23 cases re-reviewed; analyst queue delayed by 4.5 hours | AML queue dashboard snapshot |
| Financial impact | No direct loss; 18 analyst hours used for re-review | workforce impact estimate |
| Regulatory / compliance | Potential SAR quality risk if drafts had been submitted | SAR submission cross-check showing zero submitted |
| Data / privacy | No PII leaked outside approved systems | DLP report DLP-AML-2026-001 |
| Security | No prompt injection or external access found | SIEM query and context payload review |
| Reputation | Internal operational issue; no external communication required | Legal / Compliance decision log |
## 4. Timeline
| Time | Event | Owner | Evidence |
|---|---|---|---|
| 09:42 | Analyst reports outdated typology in SAR draft | AML QA Lead | QA ticket AML-QA-7782 |
| 09:50 | IC opens SEV1 war room and assigns scribe | AI Platform SRE Lead | incident channel export |
| 10:05 | Impact query identifies 23 affected cases | Data Engineer | impacted_case_query.sql |
| 10:18 | SAR narrative generation disabled; evidence summary remains read-only | Platform Lead | route_policy_change_2026_06_29 |
| 10:31 | Index rolled back to v2026.06.21 | RAG Owner | index manifest diff |
| 12:10 | Analysts complete first 10 case re-reviews | AML Operations | QA review sample |
| 16:40 | No submitted SARs found for affected drafts | Compliance | SAR submission reconciliation |
## 5. Detection
- Which signal detected the issue: Human QA by senior AML analyst
- Which signal should have detected it earlier: Freshness regression in the index release gate
- Detection gap: Citation checker validated source existence but not effective date
- Alert / dashboard changes: Added retired-source citation alert and freshness breach tile
## 6. Containment and Recovery
- Immediate containment: Disabled SAR narrative draft generation for AML Copilot
- Rollback / route / kill switch used: L1 response mode switch plus index rollback to v2026.06.21
- Fallback experience: Analysts receive evidence summary and link to policy portal; narrative written manually
- Recovery validation: 50 AML golden cases, 10 retired-typology adversarial cases and 23 affected cases rechecked
- Restart approval: Required from Model Risk, AML Business Owner and AI Reliability Review Board
## 7. Root Cause and Contributing Factors
### Direct root cause
The AML RAG index release included retired typology guidance without effective-date filtering, allowing outdated evidence to support generated SAR narrative text.
### Contributing factors
| Factor | Explanation | Control gap |
|---|---|---|
| Product boundary | Narrative generation was allowed for all AML typology questions | No high-risk narrative freshness gate |
| Architecture | RAG index and narrative prompt were released independently | Component release coupling missing |
| Data / RAG | Retired documents remained searchable with low metadata quality | Effective-date filter and source owner approval missing |
| Model / prompt | Prompt encouraged concise narrative even when evidence was stale | Answerability instruction did not include retired-source refusal |
| Tool / workflow | No external write tool was involved | Tool control worked as designed |
| Monitoring | Citation support did not check source validity period | Freshness metric absent |
| Human review | Analyst QA caught the issue before submission | Human review worked but late in workflow |
| Governance | Index release did not require Model Risk review for retired policies | Gate scope too narrow |
## 8. Why Existing Controls Failed
| Control | Expected behavior | Actual behavior | Fix |
|---|---|---|---|
| Citation checker | Ensure narrative claims are supported by cited evidence | Confirmed document existed but ignored retirement date | Add effective-date validation and retired-source block |
| Index release gate | Prevent stale or unauthorized policy from entering production | Checked document count and ACL only | Add source owner approval and freshness regression |
| Human review | Catch low-quality narrative before regulatory submission | Caught issue before submission | Move freshness alert earlier in workflow |
## 9. Corrective Actions
| Action ID | Action | Owner | Due date | Verification evidence | Closure approver |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| CA-AML-001 | Add effective-date filter to AML retrieval | RAG Owner | 2026-07-03 | 60-case retrieval regression pass | Model Risk |
| CA-AML-002 | Block narrative generation when citation freshness fails | AI Platform Lead | 2026-07-05 | 10 retired-typology cases refused or escalated | AML Business Owner |
| CA-AML-003 | Add AML index release owner approval | Data Governance Lead | 2026-07-08 | signed source manifest in evidence binder | Compliance |
## 10. Regression and Recurrence Prevention
- New eval cases: 50 AML SAR narrative golden cases with citation support and freshness assertions
- New adversarial cases: 10 retired typology and conflicting policy cases
- New monitoring: retired-source citation rate, freshness_days p95, narrative blocked by freshness gate
- Release gate changes: AML index release requires source owner approval and freshness regression pass
- Architecture decision records: ADR-AML-004 requires evidence freshness gate before regulated narrative generation
- Runbook changes: Bad retrieval containment now requires index rollback plus affected case query
- Game day scenario added: AML retired typology tabletop for quarterly reliability exercise
## 11. Communication
- Customer communication: Not required because no customer-facing output or account action occurred
- Regulator / examiner communication: Prepared evidence pack for examiner request; no proactive notice recommended by Legal / Compliance
- Board / executive communication: Included in monthly AI risk dashboard as SEV1 contained incident
- Internal operations guidance: AML analysts instructed to use manual narrative drafting until restart approval
## 12. Residual Risk Decision
- Residual risk: Low for restarted narrative generation after freshness gate; medium for same-day policy updates until source SLA improves
- Risk owner: Head of AML Operations
- Accepted / rejected / requires additional controls: Accepted with source-owner SLA and monthly freshness audit
- Next review date: 2026-08-15 AI Reliability Review Board
9.2 Root Cause Tree for AI Incidents
| Layer | Questions |
|---|---|
| Business boundary | AI 是否被允许处理这个 intent、客户类型、地区、产品或风险等级? |
| Data source | 证据是否权威、最新、可访问、按权限过滤、可追溯? |
| Retrieval | 查询改写、filter、top_k、reranker、citation 是否把正确证据带入上下文? |
| Prompt / policy | 指令是否冲突、过宽、未区分可信和不可信上下文? |
| Model | 模型是否升级、route 改变、参数改变、能力或拒答行为变化? |
| Tool | 工具权限、schema、审批、幂等、回滚、side effect 是否受控? |
| Judge / guardrail | 拦截或评分是否覆盖该失败模式,是否被绕过或漂移? |
| Human review | 人审是否看到足够证据,是否有时间、权力和流程去覆盖 AI? |
| Monitoring | 质量、安全、成本、延迟、业务 outcome 是否有阈值和 owner? |
| Governance | 变更是否经过 gate,风险是否被正式接受,owner 是否明确? |
10. Corrective Action Register
Corrective action 的目标不是关闭 Jira,而是降低复发概率或影响范围。每个行动项都必须有验证证据。
| Field | 填写标准 | 合格样例 |
|---|---|---|
| Action ID | 与 incident ID 关联 | CA-AML-2026-001 |
| Failure mode | 对应 taxonomy | Bad retrieval + hallucinated SAR narrative |
| Control objective | 要降低的风险 | 高风险 AML narrative 必须由有效证据支持 |
| Action | 可执行变更 | 增加 citation support gate,低于阈值时只输出 evidence summary |
| Owner | 单一责任人 | AML AI Platform Lead |
| Due date | 明确日期 | 2026-07-12 |
| Verification evidence | 可复核结果 | 50 个 SAR golden cases 全部通过;10 个过期 typology cases 被拒答 |
| Risk reduction | 预期效果 | 降低错误 narrative 进入 analyst workflow 的概率 |
| Residual risk | 仍然存在的风险 | 新 typology 发布当天仍可能存在 freshness gap |
| Closure approver | 有权关闭的人 | Model Risk + AML Business Owner |
| Next review | 防止行动项假关闭 | 2026-08-15 review board |
10.1 Action 类型
| Type | 例子 | 何时使用 |
|---|---|---|
| Eval action | 新增 golden / adversarial / regression cases | 事故样本可转成可重复测试 |
| Architecture action | 增加 policy engine、tool gateway、route isolation、index manifest | 根因是边界和控制不足 |
| Product action | 缩小 use case、改变 disclosure、增加人工入口、限制答案类型 | AI 被放进了不适合的客户旅程 |
| Data action | source trust、owner approval、freshness SLO、ACL、data contract | RAG / data lineage 是根因 |
| Operations action | alert、runbook、on-call、war room、rollback drill | 响应慢、检测晚、证据不足 |
| Governance action | review board、approval gate、risk acceptance、policy update | 决策链或责任边界不清 |
| Vendor action | SLA、model pinning、change notice、exit plan、support escalation | 外部依赖导致或放大事故 |
10.2 Recurrence Prevention Ladder
| Level | 防复发强度 | 示例 |
|---|---|---|
| L0 Manual reminder | 依赖人记住 | 仅培训坐席“注意检查引用” |
| L1 Checklist | 依赖流程提醒 | 上线前检查 prompt / index version |
| L2 Monitoring | 能发现 | bad citation rate alert |
| L3 Gate | 能阻止发布 | eval fail 时 CI 阻止 prompt / index release |
| L4 Runtime control | 能实时阻断 | answerability gate、DLP、tool gateway、policy engine |
| L5 Architectural isolation | 能限制 blast radius | model route isolation、read-only mode、tenant boundary、kill switch |
| L6 Governance system | 能持续学习 | review board、audit sample、game day、risk appetite update |
复盘后的行动项至少应达到 L3;SEV0 / SEV1 的核心失效应优先设计到 L4 或 L5。
11. Architecture and Product Mapping
11.1 从事故类型到架构控制
| Incident type | Product decision | Architecture control | Governance evidence |
|---|---|---|---|
| Bad retrieval | 明确哪些答案必须引用权威来源 | Source registry、ACL filter、index manifest、citation checker | Data owner approval、retrieval eval report |
| Hallucination | 高风险答案从自由生成改为模板 / 引用摘要 | Answerability classifier、groundedness gate、template composer | Prompt approval、quality dashboard |
| Policy bypass | 将业务规则从 prompt 中外置 | Policy engine、intent classifier、decision table、guardrail trace | Compliance sign-off、policy version log |
| Tool misuse | 定义 read / draft / act 边界 | Tool gateway、ABAC、dual control、idempotency、dry-run | Permission matrix、approval evidence |
| PII leak | 限制输入、输出、日志和外发字段 | DLP、field redaction、egress gateway、log masking | Privacy impact record、DLP test |
| Cost spike | 定义每个 outcome 的 unit economics | Cost ledger、quota、route policy、cache、loop detector | Budget review、FinOps dashboard |
| Latency degradation | 设定按风险分层的响应体验 | Fast path、async review、timeout budget、fallback response | SLO document、capacity test |
| Model drift | 明确模型升级不是透明小变更 | Model alias pinning、canary、shadow eval、rollback | Change approval、eval comparison |
| Prompt injection | 将不可信内容和工具权限隔离 | Context labeling、sandbox、tool approval、memory write policy | Red-team report、ATLAS mapping |
11.2 AI Reliability ADR 模板
# ADR-AML-004: Require Evidence Freshness Gate Before SAR Narrative Generation
## Context
- Incident / risk trigger: AI-INC-AML-2026-001 showed SAR narrative could cite retired typology guidance
- Affected use case: AML Copilot SAR narrative drafting
- Risk tier: Tier 1 regulated decision-support workflow
- Current weakness: Citation checker verifies support but does not verify source effective date or retirement status
## Decision
- Chosen architecture / product control: Add evidence freshness gate before narrative generation; stale evidence forces evidence-summary-only mode
- Components changed: Retrieval metadata filter, citation checker, narrative composer, release gate
- Runtime behavior: If any cited AML policy source is retired or outside effective date, the system refuses narrative generation and escalates to analyst manual drafting
- Rollback approach: Disable freshness gate through controlled feature flag only after IC and Model Risk approval; default fallback is evidence-summary-only mode
## Options Considered
| Option | Benefit | Risk | Decision |
|---|---|---|---|
| Prompt-only warning | Fast to implement | Model may still use stale evidence under pressure | Rejected |
| Freshness gate before narrative | Blocks stale regulated narrative at runtime | Some valid edge cases require manual drafting | Chosen |
| Full narrative shutdown | Maximum safety | Removes productivity benefit for low-risk summaries | Reserved for SEV1 containment |
## Consequences
- Reliability impact: Reduces recurrence of stale-source SAR narrative and creates auditable block events
- Customer impact: No direct customer-facing impact; analyst workflow may require more manual drafting during stale-source periods
- Cost / latency impact: Adds citation metadata check with negligible latency; may increase manual review hours
- Governance impact: AML source owner approval becomes mandatory for index release
- Residual risk: Same-day policy changes can still create a temporary gap until source SLA is met
## Verification
- Eval cases: 50 AML golden cases and 10 retired-source adversarial cases
- Monitoring: retired-source block rate, freshness_days p95, manual drafting escalation count
- Game day scenario: Quarterly AML retired typology tabletop
- Review board approval: Required before re-enabling narrative generation
11.3 Release Gate After Incident
| Gate | Required evidence |
|---|---|
| G1 Scope gate | Use case boundary updated;forbidden uses 明确;fallback owner 确认 |
| G2 Component gate | model / prompt / index / tool / policy version map 完整 |
| G3 Eval gate | 事故样本进入 golden set;regression 通过;expert sample 通过 |
| G4 Security / privacy gate | DLP、prompt injection、tool misuse、egress、log masking 测试通过 |
| G5 Operations gate | runbook、kill switch、on-call、alert、dashboard 已更新 |
| G6 Governance gate | Model Risk / Compliance / Business Owner 对 residual risk 做出决策 |
| G7 Restart gate | 分阶段放量计划、rollback condition、monitoring window 明确 |
12. Customer / Regulator / Board Communication
沟通不是 PR 话术,而是控制面的一部分。越早准备结构化事实,越少在压力下做模糊承诺。
12.1 Communication Matrix
| Audience | 关注问题 | 不能说 | 应该准备 |
|---|---|---|---|
| Customers | 我是否受影响,发生了什么,如何补救,是否需要行动 | “AI 偶尔会错”“我们已优化模型” | 事实、影响、补救、人工渠道、时间线、后续通知 |
| Frontline / Operations | 现在怎么处理客户、案例、例外和人工队列 | “先凭经验处理” | 临时 SOP、话术、升级条件、受影响 case list |
| Executives | 影响范围、风险、恢复、补救成本、下一步决策 | 只报技术细节 | SEV、impact, containment、customer/regulatory exposure、decision needed |
| Board / Risk Committee | 是否触及风险偏好、控制是否失效、治理是否有效 | “项目团队会修好” | root cause theme、risk appetite、corrective action、accountability、timeline |
| Regulator / Examiner | 是否影响受监管义务、客户权益、数据、模型风险、第三方 | 未经确认的法律结论 | verified facts、controls、affected population、remediation、evidence path |
| Vendor | 是否供应商导致、需要什么证据、SLA 是否触发 | 只口头描述 | trace sample、timestamps、model/route IDs、contract notice、RCA request |
12.2 Executive Update 模板
# AI Incident Executive Update
- Incident ID:
- Severity:
- Current status:
- Affected capability:
- What happened:
- Customer / business impact:
- Data / privacy / security exposure:
- Regulatory exposure:
- Containment completed:
- Remaining risk:
- Decisions needed:
- Next update time:
12.3 Regulator / Examiner Response Pack
| Section | 内容 |
|---|---|
| Factual summary | 已验证事实、时间线、影响范围,不包含猜测 |
| System description | AI system、workflow、human role、model/RAG/tool components |
| Control design | 上线前控制、监控、人工复核、policy、DLP、tool gateway |
| Control failure | 哪些控制未生效、为什么未生效 |
| Customer impact | 受影响对象、补救、通知、投诉处理 |
| Remediation | containment、corrective actions、completion evidence |
| Governance | owner、review board、risk acceptance、management oversight |
| Evidence index | trace、logs、evals、approval、communication、postmortem 路径 |
12.4 Board Brief 结构
| Slide | 内容 |
|---|---|
| 1. Incident summary | SEV、时间线、影响、当前状态 |
| 2. Business and customer impact | 客户、员工、案例、资金、投诉、品牌 |
| 3. Risk and control view | 失效控制、残余风险、风险偏好影响 |
| 4. Management action | containment、corrective actions、owner、due date |
| 5. Governance ask | 需要董事会知情、批准、预算、风险接受或监督的事项 |
13. AI Reliability Review Board
AI Reliability Review Board 不是大型委员会,而是高风险 AI 系统的运营门禁。它把 incident、eval regression、architecture change、model update、vendor change 和 risk acceptance 放在同一个决策桌上。
13.1 Charter
| Item | 内容 |
|---|---|
| Mission | 降低 AI 事故复发概率和影响范围,确保高风险 AI use case 的 release、change、restart 和 residual risk 有证据、有 owner、有审批 |
| Scope | Tier 1 / Tier 2 AI systems;SEV0-SEV2 incidents;model/prompt/index/tool/policy 高风险变更 |
| Decision rights | approve restart、require additional controls、block release、accept residual risk、escalate to executive risk committee |
| Members | AI Product、AI Platform、Architecture、SRE、Security、Privacy、Model Risk、Compliance、Business Owner、Audit observer |
| Cadence | SEV0/1 event-driven;SEV2 weekly;normal monthly reliability review |
| Inputs | incident postmortem、eval trend、SLO breach、cost trend、red-team result、vendor notice、customer complaint trend |
| Outputs | decision log、corrective action status、risk acceptance、architecture ADR、game day backlog |
13.2 Review Agenda
| Agenda item | 决策问题 |
|---|---|
| Open incidents | 是否真正 containment,是否仍有客户/监管风险 |
| Corrective actions | 是否有逾期、假关闭、缺验证证据的行动项 |
| Eval and drift | 哪些模型 / prompt / index / tool 出现质量或安全退化 |
| SLO / cost / latency | 是否触发 error budget 或 budget guardrail |
| Customer harm signals | 投诉、人工升级、拒绝率、错误补救是否异常 |
| Vendor changes | 是否需要 re-validation、model pinning 或 exit test |
| Game day findings | 演练发现是否进入 release gate 和 runbook |
13.3 Decision Categories
| Decision | Criteria | Evidence |
|---|---|---|
| Restart approved | containment 完成,fix 通过 regression,monitoring window 明确 | eval report、trace sample、owner sign-off |
| Restart with restrictions | 核心风险降低,但 residual risk 仍需限制 | disabled intent、human review、traffic cap |
| Continue shutdown | 影响或根因不清,无法证明控制有效 | incomplete RCA、failed regression、unresolved privacy/legal issue |
| Risk accepted | 业务决定接受残余风险,并有补偿控制 | risk memo、business sign-off、review date |
| Escalate | 超出 board 权限或触及监管/董事会风险偏好 | executive memo、legal/compliance analysis |
14. Game Days and Tabletops
Game day 的目标不是表演成熟,而是暴露系统、流程和组织在压力下的真实弱点。
14.1 Game Day 设计原则
| 原则 | 解释 |
|---|---|
| 基于真实 trace | 用生产相似的请求、知识库、工具权限和角色,不只用抽象故事 |
| 覆盖跨职能决策 | Product governance、architecture、SRE、security、privacy、model risk、compliance 都要做决定 |
| 演练证据保全 | 检查是否能找到 prompt、index、retrieval、tool、DLP、approval 和 impacted population |
| 演练 kill switch | 不只讨论是否关闭,要实际验证配置、权限和恢复步骤 |
| 生成行动项 | 每次演练必须产出 corrective actions 和 owner |
14.2 Tabletop Scenarios
| Scenario | Inject | Expected decisions | Evidence to test |
|---|---|---|---|
| Bad retrieval in AML copilot | 分析员发现 SAR narrative 引用了过期 typology | 停 narrative 生成、回滚 index、识别受影响 case、Model Risk review | index manifest、retrieved docs、case list、regression eval |
| KYC assistant PII leak | 外部供应商 ticket 中出现客户身份证件摘要 | 关闭外发、privacy workflow、log scan、vendor notice | egress log、DLP decision、affected records、retention |
| Payment dispute agent tool misuse | Agent 重复提交 provisional credit | 禁用写工具、撤销重复动作、检查 idempotency、客户补救 | tool span、approval ID、transaction ledger、compensation |
| Customer-facing AI hallucination | 客户被告知不存在的 fee waiver 权利 | 关闭自由生成、发布坐席话术、识别客户、投诉处理 | output samples、customer IDs、policy source、QA decisions |
| Prompt injection via uploaded PDF | 投诉附件诱导 Agent 调用外部 email tool | 隔离 upload path、关闭外发工具、security incident triage | malicious payload、context label、tool proposal、blocked/allowed decision |
| Cost spike via loop | Planner 重复检索和 judge,成本 8 倍上升 | 预算熔断、rate limit、关闭 retry loop、恢复 unit cost | cost ledger、trace loop、route policy、quota |
| Latency degradation | p95 从 8s 到 35s,人工队列积压 | 降级模型、异步处理、减少 rerank、业务 SLA 更新 | latency spans、queue wait、fallback success |
| Model drift after vendor upgrade | 同一 golden set fail 率从 3% 到 18% | pin 旧模型、暂停 rollout、vendor RCA、shadow eval | model alias、eval diff、vendor notice、route log |
14.3 Game Day Scorecard
| Dimension | 1 - Weak | 3 - Adequate | 5 - Strong |
|---|---|---|---|
| Detection | 只能靠人工发现 | 有部分 alert,但信号分散 | 自动 alert 命中 failure mode,owner 清晰 |
| Triage | 争论分类和 SEV | 30 分钟内完成初判 | 15 分钟内明确 SEV、blast radius 和 war room |
| Containment | 不知道关闭哪里 | 能手动关闭主要路径 | kill switch 分层、可验证、可回滚 |
| Evidence | 找不到版本或 trace | 能找到核心日志 | trace、版本、impact query、tool side effect 完整 |
| Communication | 技术更新难被业务理解 | 有基础 executive update | 客户/监管/董事会版本清晰、事实一致 |
| Prevention | 只写行动项 | 有 owner 和 due date | 行动项有 regression evidence 和 review board closure |
15. 金融零售 AI 事故案例
15.1 AML Copilot:错误检索导致 SAR narrative 风险
| 项目 | 内容 |
|---|---|
| System | AML Copilot,为分析员总结告警证据并起草 SAR narrative |
| Failure | RAG 检索到过期 typology guidance,模型把旧规则写成当前风险理由 |
| Severity | SEV1;若 narrative 已提交监管则升 SEV0 |
| Detection | Senior analyst QA 发现 narrative 与最新政策冲突;citation checker 未检查 effective date |
| Containment | 关闭 SAR narrative 自动草稿,只保留 evidence summary;回滚 index;高风险 case 全部人工复核 |
| Root cause | Index manifest 没有 policy effective date;retriever freshness filter 未启用;release gate 未包含过期 typology regression |
| Corrective actions | 增加 freshness SLO;policy source owner 审批;50 个 AML regression cases;narrative 输出必须带 citation support score |
| Evidence artifact | AML AI Incident Postmortem + Retrieval Freshness ADR + SAR Narrative Regression Pack |
15.2 KYC Assistant:PII 外发到供应商系统
| 项目 | 内容 |
|---|---|
| System | KYC 文档审核助手,自动总结客户身份证明和缺失项 |
| Failure | Assistant 把客户身份证件摘要写入外部 vendor support ticket,ticket 系统不在批准处理范围 |
| Severity | SEV1;若包含大规模证件号或跨境处理则 SEV0 |
| Detection | DLP 在 egress gateway 命中身份证号 pattern;privacy alert 自动升级 |
| Containment | 关闭外发 ticket tool;清理 vendor ticket;启用 legal hold;识别 affected customers;暂停相关日志导出 |
| Root cause | Tool gateway 未区分内部 case note 和外部 support ticket;DLP 只在最终回答启用,未覆盖 tool payload |
| Corrective actions | egress policy 按目的绑定;tool input field redaction;vendor processor matrix 更新;PII leak adversarial eval |
| Evidence artifact | KYC PII Incident Pack + Egress Policy Matrix + DLP Regression Evidence |
15.3 Payment Dispute Agent:工具误用导致重复 provisional credit
| 项目 | 内容 |
|---|---|
| System | 支付争议处理 Agent,读取争议材料、建议下一步、草拟客户通知 |
| Failure | Agent 在 retry 后重复调用 provisional credit tool,幂等 key 未绑定 dispute ID 和 amount |
| Severity | SEV1;若批量资金影响或无法撤销则 SEV0 |
| Detection | 账务对账发现同一 dispute 两笔 provisional credit;tool side effect alert 滞后 |
| Containment | 禁用写工具;切只读建议模式;冻结受影响 dispute;启动客户和账务补救 |
| Root cause | Tool schema 未要求 idempotency key;approval UI 未展示已执行 action;retry policy 未识别 side effect |
| Corrective actions | 写工具强制 idempotency;approval ledger;retry 禁止重复 side effect;payment game day 每季度演练 |
| Evidence artifact | Payment Agent Tool Misuse Postmortem + Tool Permission / Idempotency ADR |
15.4 Customer-Facing AI:错误费用减免承诺
| 项目 | 内容 |
|---|---|
| System | 信用卡客服 AI,客户可直接询问费用、争议、权益和投诉 |
| Failure | AI 虚构“年费可无条件减免一次”的政策,客户认为银行已承诺 |
| Severity | SEV1,因为客户可见且涉及费用和权利;若大规模传播则 SEV0 |
| Detection | 投诉系统中 fee waiver 关键词异常上升;QA 抽样确认 AI 输出无来源支持 |
| Containment | 关闭费用政策自由回答;改用模板 + 权威 API;受影响客户转人工补救 |
| Root cause | Answerability gate 未覆盖费用承诺;UI 披露没有区分一般信息和正式承诺;citation optional |
| Corrective actions | fee / rate / eligibility 全部 template locking;complaint trigger dashboard;customer remediation script |
| Evidence artifact | Customer-Facing AI Incident Memo + Regulated Conversation Boundary Card |
15.5 Fraud Review Copilot:模型漂移导致误报解释退化
| 项目 | 内容 |
|---|---|
| System | 欺诈复核 Copilot,帮助运营解释交易阻断原因并建议下一步 |
| Failure | Vendor 模型升级后,解释变得更自信但证据更少,human override 从 6% 升到 19% |
| Severity | SEV2;若导致客户账户错误冻结或拒绝申诉则 SEV1 |
| Detection | Human reject spike + golden set scheduled eval fail |
| Containment | Pin previous model;扩大人工复核;暂停新模型 rollout |
| Root cause | Model alias 未 pin;vendor change notice 未进入 AI release gate;shadow eval 样本未覆盖冻结解释 |
| Corrective actions | model alias pinning;vendor change intake;fraud explanation golden set;review board restart approval |
| Evidence artifact | Model Drift Incident Review + Vendor Change Gate Checklist |
16. Templates and Artifacts
16.1 AI Incident Intake Card
| Field | Example |
|---|---|
| Incident ID | AI-INC-2026-001 |
| Reporter | AML QA Lead |
| Detection channel | Human QA + citation support alert |
| Use case | AML Copilot SAR narrative |
| Suspected category | Bad retrieval / hallucination |
| Initial SEV | SEV1 |
| Customer / regulatory exposure | Potential regulatory narrative quality issue; no submission confirmed |
| Active blast radius | 23 cases generated since index v2026.06.28 |
| Immediate ask | Disable SAR narrative generation and run affected case query |
16.2 Affected Population Query Spec
| Question | Query requirement |
|---|---|
| 哪些输出可能受影响 | 按 prompt_version、index_version、model_route、time window、intent、risk_tier 查询 |
| 哪些客户或案例受影响 | 关联 case_id、customer_id、employee_id、channel、workflow_state |
| 是否发生工具 side effect | 关联 tool_call、approval_id、side_effect、ledger / case status |
| 是否已经客户可见或监管提交 | 关联 message_sent、document_exported、SAR_submitted、letter_generated |
| 是否已人工覆盖 | 关联 review_decision、edit_reason、override_time |
16.3 Customer Remediation Worksheet
| Field | 填写标准 |
|---|---|
| Affected segment | 客户类型、产品、地区、时间范围 |
| Harm hypothesis | 错误费用、错误拒绝、错误说明、隐私暴露、延迟、错误补偿 |
| Verification method | trace + CRM + transaction / case system cross-check |
| Remediation action | 更正通知、费用调整、人工回访、投诉升级、数据删除请求 |
| Approval | Legal、Compliance、Business Owner、Customer Ops |
| Evidence | customer list hash、message template、completion status、exception log |
16.4 AI Reliability Dashboard Spec
| Tile | Metric | Threshold | Owner |
|---|---|---|---|
| Incident count by category | SEV0-SEV4 per month | SEV1+ immediate review | Reliability Lead |
| Bad retrieval rate | citation unsupported / stale / ACL fail | High-risk use case > 1% alert | Data / RAG Owner |
| Hallucination / groundedness | groundedness fail rate | Tier 1 > 0.5% alert | Model Risk |
| Tool policy violations | blocked / attempted / allowed high-risk tool calls | Any unexpected allowed high-risk call | Security / Tool Owner |
| PII / DLP | DLP hit by route and destination | Any external PII hit | Privacy |
| Cost unit economics | cost per resolved case / analysis / dispute | > approved budget guardrail | Platform operations / FinOps |
| Latency SLO | p95 TTFT / total / tool latency | breach for 3 intervals | SRE |
| Human reject / override | rejected outputs, edit distance, override reason | spike vs baseline | Business Ops |
| Eval regression | scheduled eval pass rate by version | high-risk fail blocks release | Validation |
| Corrective action aging | overdue, no evidence, repeated failure | overdue SEV1 action escalates | Review Board |
16.5 Reliability Review Board Packet
| Section | 内容 |
|---|---|
| Open incidents | SEV、status、owner、next decision |
| Closed incidents | postmortem link、RCA theme、closure evidence |
| Corrective actions | overdue、blocked、accepted risk、closed with evidence |
| Eval / drift | regressions、model changes、prompt / index changes |
| Security / privacy | injection attempts、PII events、tool gateway exceptions |
| SLO / cost | latency, availability, unit cost, error budget |
| Customer harm | complaints、handoff failure、remediation status |
| Decisions requested | restart、block release、accept residual risk、fund control |
17. 30-Day System Learning Path:AI Incident and Reliability Evidence Pack
目标:30 天内围绕一个金融零售 AI use case,完成一套可审查的 AI Incident / Postmortem / Reliability evidence pack。推荐主线选择 AML Copilot、KYC Assistant、Payment Dispute Agent 或 Customer-Facing AI。
| Day | 任务 | Artifact |
|---|---|---|
| 1 | 选择 use case,定义 AI 行为边界、risk tier、禁止用途 | Use Case Boundary Card |
| 2 | 画系统组件:model、prompt、RAG、tool、policy、judge、human handoff | Component Map |
| 3 | 定义 AI incident taxonomy,选 8-10 个最相关 failure modes | Incident Taxonomy |
| 4 | 设计 SEV0-SEV4 severity model | Severity Matrix |
| 5 | 设计 incident command RACI 和 war room cadence | Incident Command Runbook |
| 6 | 定义 trace evidence 字段 | Evidence Schema |
| 7 | 设计 AI reliability dashboard | Dashboard Spec |
| 8 | 写 bad retrieval scenario | Scenario Card 1 |
| 9 | 写 hallucination / policy bypass scenario | Scenario Card 2 |
| 10 | 写 tool misuse scenario | Scenario Card 3 |
| 11 | 写 PII leak scenario | Scenario Card 4 |
| 12 | 写 cost spike / latency degradation scenario | Scenario Card 5 |
| 13 | 写 model drift / eval regression scenario | Scenario Card 6 |
| 14 | 设计 containment / rollback matrix | Rollback Matrix |
| 15 | 设计 kill switch 分层 | Kill Switch Spec |
| 16 | 选择一个 scenario,写完整 incident timeline | Incident Timeline |
| 17 | 写 affected population query spec | Impact Query Spec |
| 18 | 写 postmortem 初版 | Postmortem Draft |
| 19 | 写 root cause tree 和 contributing factors | RCA Worksheet |
| 20 | 写 corrective action register | Corrective Action Register |
| 21 | 把事故样本转成 eval regression cases | Regression Pack |
| 22 | 写 architecture ADR | Reliability ADR |
| 23 | 写 customer / operations communication | Customer and Ops Comms |
| 24 | 写 regulator / board brief | Governance Communication Pack |
| 25 | 设计 reliability review board charter | Review Board Charter |
| 26 | 运行一次 tabletop,记录 decision log | Game Day Decision Log |
| 27 | 根据 tabletop 更新 runbook 和 dashboard | Runbook Revision |
| 28 | 汇总 evidence binder index | Evidence Index |
| 29 | 写 1500-2500 字 reliability case study | Reliability Case Study |
| 30 | 准备 design review question bank 和 decision narrative | Decision Narrative Pack |
17.1 30 天最终交付包
| Artifact | 证据价值 |
|---|---|
| Executive one-pager | 展示你能向高管解释 AI 事故风险和决策 |
| System and control map | 展示架构判断,而不是只做流程文档 |
| Incident taxonomy + SEV model | 展示高级风险分类能力 |
| Postmortem + corrective action register | 展示生产可靠性和治理闭环 |
| Game day pack | 展示主动验证和组织协同能力 |
| Regression pack | 展示把事故样本转成 EvalOps 的能力 |
| Board / regulator communication | 展示金融零售场景的风险表达 |
18. Design Review Questions
这些问题用于 reliability architecture review、postmortem review 和 restart gate,不用于背诵话术。每个问题都应落到 severity、containment、evidence、corrective action 和 governance decision。
18.1 AI Incident 与普通 SRE Incident 的边界
Review question:AI incident response 和普通 SRE incident response 最大区别是什么?
Design position:普通 SRE 主要处理 availability、latency、error rate。AI incident 还要处理语义正确性、证据支持、政策边界、工具动作、数据泄露、模型漂移和客户/监管影响。HTTP 200 也可能是事故,所以必须有 trace、eval、guardrail、human review 和治理闭环。
System reasoning:AI incident 应拆成 detect、triage、command、contain、recover、postmortem、regression、governance。关键不是“模型错了”,而是定位哪个组件失效:prompt、RAG、index、policy、tool、judge、model route、human handoff 或 vendor change。然后按风险分级决定是否 rollback model、回滚 index、禁用工具、切模板、人审、客户补救和监管沟通。复盘后必须把事故样本进入 regression eval 和 release gate,否则只是写报告。
Evidence check:incident record 是否能同时复原 technical health、semantic failure、customer impact、control failure 和 restart condition。
18.2 Severity Model
Review question:如何给 AI 事故分级?
Design position:不要只按技术故障分级,而要按客户伤害、监管暴露、数据敏感度、自动化程度、blast radius、可逆性和检测来源分级。客户可见错误承诺、PII 外泄、高风险工具误执行、AML/KYC/credit 流程系统性错误,最低就应该是 SEV1。
System reasoning:SEV0-SEV4 可以形成分层处置。SEV0 是重大客户伤害、监管违规、大规模数据泄露或不可逆工具动作;SEV1 是高影响但可 containment 的受监管流程或客户可见问题;SEV2 是质量、成本、延迟、eval 显著退化;SEV3 是被控制捕获的局部问题;SEV4 是 hazard 或演练发现。这样 severity 能直接驱动 war room、通知、postmortem 深度、review board 和 restart gate。
Evidence check:severity decision 是否记录判定维度、升级规则、通知要求、review depth 和 restart gate。
18.3 Bad Retrieval Containment
Review question:Bad retrieval 导致错误答案时如何处理?
Design position:先止血:回滚 index 或禁用错误来源,高风险问题切人工或模板。然后保留 query、retrieved doc IDs、index version、ACL、citation 和输出样本。根因通常在 source trust、freshness、ACL、chunking、reranker 或 release gate。最后把样本加入 retrieval regression。
System reasoning:先判断是否客户可见或影响受监管流程。如果是,立即关闭相关 intent 的自由生成,切换到权威搜索或人工复核。技术上做 index manifest diff、source owner check、freshness filter、ACL test 和 citation support check。治理上让 Data Owner 和 Model Risk 共同确认恢复条件。防复发不是“调 prompt”,而是 source registry、index release gate、retrieval eval、freshness SLO 和 impacted population query。
Evidence check:evidence pack 是否包含 index manifest、retrieval trace、ACL decision、citation support、affected population query 和 regression case。
18.4 Agent Tool Misuse 防线
Review question:Agent tool misuse 为什么危险,如何设计防线?
Design position:Tool misuse 把语言错误放大成真实业务动作,比如重复退款、错误关闭投诉、越权查账户。防线要在工具网关,而不是 prompt:最小权限、risk-tiered tools、approval、idempotency、dry-run、step budget、side-effect logging 和 kill switch。
System reasoning:工具应分为 read-only、draft、write-low、write-high、irreversible。模型只能 propose,系统通过 ABAC / purpose binding / policy engine 决定是否 allowed、blocked 或 requires approval。所有写动作必须有 idempotency key、approval ID、ledger、reversal path 和 trace。事故时第一步通常是把写工具切只读,保全 side effect log,识别 affected population,再做补偿和 regression。
Evidence check:tool gateway 是否记录 actor、purpose、approval、action hash、idempotency key、side effect 和 reversal path。
18.5 PII Leak Response
Review question:PII leak 事故如何处理?
Design position:先停止外发和明文日志,隔离受影响 route,保全 trace 和 egress log,识别字段、记录数、目的地和保留状态。然后由 privacy、legal、security 判断通知和补救。防复发要覆盖输入、输出、tool payload、日志和供应商调用,不只做回答过滤。
System reasoning:证据包应包含 DLP decision、output sample、egress destination、trace ID、redaction status、affected records 和 vendor handling。Containment 包括关闭外发工具、清理第三方 ticket、禁用日志导出、启用 field redaction。根因可能是目的绑定缺失、tool gateway 未做 DLP、日志策略错误或供应商处理范围不清。修复要进入 DLP regression、egress policy、privacy impact record 和 vendor control。
Evidence check:privacy incident record 是否能证明数据类别、外发路径、保留状态、补救动作和供应商控制。
18.6 Blameless Postmortem With Accountability
Review question:Postmortem 怎么做到无责但不失去 accountability?
Design position:无责不是无人负责。无责是避免追责个人,聚焦系统为什么让合理的人在当时信息下做出错误决策;accountability 是每个 corrective action 都有 owner、due date、验证证据和关闭审批。
System reasoning:好的 postmortem 会记录时间线、影响、检测缺口、控制失效、根因和贡献因素。它不会写“某人没审核好”或“模型幻觉了”,而会问人审界面有没有显示证据、release gate 为什么没覆盖样本、policy 为什么只写在 prompt、tool 为什么没有 approval。最后行动项必须能验证,例如新增 50 个 regression cases、启用 kill switch、通过 DLP test、更新 ADR,而不是“加强培训”。
Evidence check:corrective action register 是否包含 owner、due date、verification evidence、closure approver 和 residual risk。
18.7 Incident To Governance Loop
Review question:如何把 AI 事故转成长期治理能力?
Design position:每个 SEV1+ 事故都应该进入三条线:eval regression、architecture decision、governance review。也就是样本进入测试,控制进入架构,残余风险进入 review board 和证据包。
System reasoning:AI Reliability Review Board 定期看 incident、eval trend、SLO、cost、security、privacy、customer harm 和 corrective action aging。事故后的 restart 需要通过 scope、component、eval、security/privacy、operations、governance 和 phased rollout gate。这样事故不只是项目组修 bug,而是改变 release gate、tool permission、source governance、model pinning、vendor controls 和 board reporting。
Evidence check:每个重大事故是否生成 regression case、ADR、gate update、risk acceptance 或 board decision。
18.8 Cost Spike As Incident
Review question:成本 spike 算不算 AI incident?
Design position:算。AI 成本 spike 可能来自长上下文、retry loop、judge 放大、工具循环或滥用,可能导致预算熔断、服务降级和单位经济性失效。它应该按业务影响和可控性分级。
System reasoning:要看 cost per outcome,而不是只看总账单。证据包括 token、route、cache、retrieval、rerank、judge、tool 和 loop trace。Containment 包括 quota、rate limit、降级模型、缩短上下文、关闭 retry loop、启用 cache。防复发是 budget guardrail、step budget、loop detector、unit economics dashboard 和 release 前成本压力测试。
Evidence check:cost incident record 是否能把 spend spike 追溯到 route、loop、tool、judge、cache 和 outcome。
18.9 Regulator / Board Communication
Review question:面对监管或董事会,AI 事故应该怎么讲?
Design position:讲事实、影响、控制、补救和治理,不讲模型黑箱借口。要说明发生了什么、谁受影响、哪些控制失效、如何 containment、如何补救、如何防复发、谁负责和何时完成。
System reasoning:需要准备两套材料:regulator / examiner response pack 和 board brief。监管材料需要 system description、control design、control failure、affected population、remediation 和 evidence index。董事会材料需要风险偏好、客户和业务影响、管理层行动、重大残余风险和需要批准的决策。所有数字都必须来自可复核查询,未确认的内容标为 under assessment。
Evidence check:external communication pack 是否区分 confirmed facts、under assessment、management action、residual risk 和 decision request。
18.10 Reliability Review Board
Review question:为什么 AI Reliability Review Board 有必要?
Design position:AI 事故根因跨产品、模型、数据、工具、安全、隐私、合规和供应商,不能靠单个团队自己判定 restart。Review Board 把事件、eval、变更、风险接受和证据放在同一个治理机制里。
System reasoning:Review Board 的价值是 decision rights。它可以批准 restart、要求额外控制、阻止 release、接受残余风险或升级高管。输入包括 postmortem、eval trend、SLO breach、cost、red-team、vendor change 和 customer harm。输出是 decision log、corrective action、ADR、risk acceptance 和 game day backlog。这比项目组“修完上线”更适合金融零售高风险 AI。
Evidence check:review board packet 是否包含输入证据、决策类别、条件、owner、due date、risk acceptance 和后续演练 backlog。
19. 自检清单
| Check | 达标标准 |
|---|---|
| Taxonomy | 覆盖 bad retrieval、hallucination、policy bypass、tool misuse、PII leak、cost spike、latency degradation、model drift、eval regression、prompt injection |
| Severity | SEV 模型同时考虑客户、监管、数据、工具、成本、延迟、blast radius 和可逆性 |
| Command | 有 IC、scribe、product、architecture、model risk、security、privacy、legal/compliance、business、vendor owner |
| Containment | 能按 model、prompt、index、retriever、tool、policy、judge、vendor 分层 rollback |
| Evidence | Trace 能复原 prompt、model、retrieval、tool、policy、judge、human review 和影响对象 |
| Postmortem | 包含 timeline、impact、RCA、contributing factors、control failure、corrective actions、residual risk |
| Corrective actions | 每个行动项有 owner、due date、verification evidence、closure approver |
| Communications | 覆盖 customer、operations、executive、board、regulator、vendor |
| Governance | 有 reliability review board、restart gate、risk acceptance、audit evidence |
| Game days | 至少覆盖 bad retrieval、PII leak、tool misuse、prompt injection、cost spike、model drift |
| Evidence pack | 能形成 incident pack、ADR、dashboard spec、game day log、board brief、decision narrative |
20. Final Principle
AI production reliability 的成熟度不在于事故少,而在于:
事故能早发现,
影响能快收敛,
证据能复原,
决策能追踪,
客户能补救,
风险能治理,
同类错误不会以同样方式再次发生。
成熟的 AI reliability 能力不只是解释模型行为,而是把 AI 系统做成可运营、可回滚、可审计、可复盘、可治理的生产系统。